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Article 
Personalized Pricing as Monopolization 
RAMSI A. WOODCOCK 
The advance of the information age will allow firms to engage in personalized 
pricing, a form of price discrimination that is profitable for firms, but 
unambiguously harmful to consumers. Antitrust can protect consumers from 
personalized pricing—also called perfect price discrimination—by condemning the 
steps firms must take to prevent resellers from undermining firms’ personalized 
pricing schemes. To personalize prices successfully, a firm must prevent those to 
whom the firm wishes to charge low prices from reselling the product to those to 
whom the firm wishes to charge high prices. Otherwise, resellers will compete away 
any difference in prices. But such steps amount to conduct that harms competitors—
here, resellers—and ultimately the consumers who pay the personalized prices that 
result. A firm that personalizes prices must therefore do the three things that 
together constitute illegal monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: harm 
competition, and consumers, in order profitably to raise prices. The right to refuse 
to deal with competitors, which would normally exempt this conduct from antitrust 
scrutiny, does not apply to personalized pricing because an available remedy—an 
order prohibiting personalized pricing, but not forcing firms to sell to resellers—
does not lead to the forced sharing and judicial price administration that the right 
to refuse to deal is meant to avoid. 
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Personalized Pricing as Monopolization 
RAMSI A. WOODCOCK * 
INTRODUCTION 
Price discrimination, the charging of different prices to different 
consumers for the same product, appears to have taken the economy by 
storm in recent years, spreading from early pioneers in the airline business 
to nearly every corner of the economy: from Amazon, which varies the 
prices of thousands of items hundreds of time per day, to Broadway shows, 
which now vary ticket prices based on day-to-day sales trends, to Disney 
World, which now varies entrance fees based on expected demand.1 
                                                                                                                     
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, Secondary Appointment, 
Department of Management, University of Kentucky Gatton College of Business and Economics. Russell 
D. Covey, Allen Grunes, Thomas Horton, Friedemann Kainer, Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Nirej Sekhon, and 
participants at the 18th Annual Loyola Antitrust Colloquium and the 2018 Annual Conference of the 
Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation provided helpful comments. 
1 The technical definition of “price discrimination” is the earning of different rates of return on units 
of the same product, meaning that the difference between unit cost and price is different for different 
units. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 621 (4th ed. 2011). By contrast, economists call the charging of different prices to different 
consumers “differential pricing.” See id. This Article is concerned with a particular form of price 
discrimination, namely, personalized pricing, that seeks to charge each consumer the maximum that the 
consumer is willing to pay for the product. See infra note 11 and accompanying text. Other than in the 
unlikely case that all consumers have the same maximum willingness to pay for all units of the product 
that they purchase, personalized pricing will therefore always involve the charging of different prices for 
different units, and so will always be differential pricing. It therefore will not be necessary, in this Article, 
to distinguish between the earning of different rates of return and the charging of different prices.  
For price discrimination by Amazon, see Harry Wallop, How Amazon Can Rip You Off by Changing 
Prices 300 Times a Year, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 29, 2017, 8:29 PM), 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4935422/How-Amazon-rip-changing-prices-300-times.html. 
For price discrimination by Disney World, see S.K., Disney Discovers Peak Pricing, ECONOMIST (Feb. 
29, 2016), https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2016/02/29/disney-discovers-peak-pricing. For 
price discrimination in Broadway ticket pricing, see Patrick Healy, New Pricing Strategy Makes the Most 
of Hot Broadway Tickets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/arts/new-
pricing-strategy-makes-the-most-of-hot-broadway-tickets.html. For the origins in the airline industry of 
personalized pricing in its modern technology-enabled form, see RICHARD H.K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED 
COMPETITION: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN AMERICA 69, 72–73 (1996); Robert G. Cross et al., 
Milestones in the Application of Analytical Pricing and Revenue Management, 10 J. REVENUE & PRICING 
MGMT. 8, 9–10 (2011). 
When a firm changes prices over time, the firm may be engaged in price discrimination or in 
dynamic pricing. Unlike price discrimination, which is the adjusting of prices based on old information 
about consumer characteristics, dynamic pricing is the adjusting of prices based on new information 
about demand. The firms listed here, like virtually all firms that charge consumers different prices for 
the same product, claim to be engaged in dynamic pricing, rather than price discrimination. See Ramsi 
A. Woodcock, Dynamic Pricing as Monopolization, 105 IOWA L. REV. (2019) (manuscript at 9–13) (on 
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Consumers are only slowly starting to realize that there are few purchases 
left for which they are likely to pay the same price as a neighbor.2  
All price discrimination has a single ultimate end, to charge each 
individual consumer a price personalized to match that consumer’s 
maximum willingness to pay for the product, because charging the highest 
possible prices that consumers are willing to pay maximizes profits.3 
Achieving that goal is difficult, however, because it requires hyper-accurate 
information about consumer willingness to pay.4 Charge a price too high, 
and no profit is earned at all because the consumer will not buy. Charge a 
price too low, and money is left on the table. The last-minute airline 
passenger who pays more for an economy class seat than the passenger 
across the aisle pays more because the airline knows that last-minute buyers 
tend in fact to be willing to pay more.5 But the airlines do not yet know 
exactly how much more each individual last-minute buyer would be willing 
to pay, limiting the airlines’ ability at present to extract the maximum 
possible profit from consumers.6 As firms learn more about their customers, 
and artificial intelligence and machine learning make it easier for them to 
understand the data, firms will improve their accuracy in predicting how 
much each individual consumer is willing to pay.7 The airlines will no longer 
rely only on the time when a consumer purchases in trying to infer whether 
a consumer is willing to pay more.8 Purchase histories, income data, the 
                                                                                                                     
file with author). But it is difficult to tell whether a price that varies over time is responding to old or new 
information, and it is therefore likely that some of the new variability of pricing practiced by firms 
represents price discrimination, and not dynamic pricing.   
2 See Neil Howe, A Special Price Just for You, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2017, 5:56 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilhowe/2017/11/17/a-special-price-just-for-you/. 
3 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 769–72 (5th ed. 2016) (comparing the profitability of various forms of price discrimination). 
4 See Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK INDUS. ORG. 597, 5–6 (1989). 
5 See ROBERT H. FRANK, THE ECONOMIC NATURALIST: IN SEARCH OF EXPLANATIONS FOR 
EVERYDAY ENIGMAS 82–83 (2007). 
6 See William J. Niejadlik, A Spotlight on Total Offer Optimization, AMADEUS THOUGHT 
LEADERSHIP PAPER 7 (2017), https://amadeus.com/documents/en/airlines/research-report/a-spotlight-
on-total-offer-optimization-web.pdf (“Most revenue management systems also have not incorporated the 
effect of loyalty and product personalization into their approaches.”). 
7 See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 
1371–75 (2017); ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND 
PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 89–100 (2016) (arguing that perfect price discrimination 
is coming, but “unlikely in many markets in the near future”); MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, 
BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY 310 (2016) (observing that big data will help companies “better 
price discriminate”). 
8 See Niejadlik, supra note 6, at 11 (arguing that artificial intelligence and machine learning will 
enable personalized pricing in the airline industry); Anita Ramasastry, Personalized Pricing in the Air? 
Why Consumers Should Be Wary of a New Airline Pricing Proposal, JUSTIA: VERDICT (May 13, 2015), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/05/13/personalized-pricing-in-the-air-why-consumers-should-be-wary-
of-a-new-airline-pricing-proposal (discussing a 2014 grant of approval by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation to the airlines to collect personalized customer data that could be used to charge 
personalized prices). 
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movement of the consumer’s mouse on the airline’s webpage, and much 
more, will give the airline a rich portrait of who the consumer is, and through 
that picture, how much the consumer is willing to pay.9 As this learning 
process spreads across the economy, consumers will enter a world in which 
the consumer will pay a price personalized with increasing accuracy to equal 
the maximum the consumer is willing to pay for every single purchase that 
the consumer makes.10  
Prices tailored to the individual maximum that a consumer is willing to 
pay, called first-degree price discrimination or personalized pricing here, 
harm consumers, by ensuring that each consumer gives up a value, in the 
form of the price paid, that is equal to the value the consumer places on the 
good, leaving the consumer no better off than if the consumer had never 
made the purchase at all.11 In economic terms, the practice deprives 
consumers of the entire surplus generated by the transaction.12 One approach 
to protecting consumers from personalized pricing would be to use the 
antitrust laws to impose a ban.13 The Robinson-Patman Act, which is part of 
                                                                                                                     
9 See Niejadlik, supra note 6, at 15 (arguing that airlines will need “shopping and conversion, 
customer behavior, and ancillary sales data” to personalize prices); Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1372–
74; Nitasha Tiku, The Dark Side of “Replay Sessions” That Record Your Every Move Online, WIRED 
(Nov. 16, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-dark-side-of-replay-sessions-that-record-
your-every-move-online/. 
10 Uber took a step in this direction when it moved to “route-based” pricing from mileage-based 
pricing. See Eric Newcomer, Uber Starts Charging What It Thinks You’re Willing to Pay (May 19, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-19/uber-s-future-may-rely-on-predicting-how-
much-you-re-willing-to-pay (“[Uber] detailed for the first time in an interview with Bloomberg a new 
pricing system that’s been in testing for months in certain cities. On Friday, Uber acknowledged to drivers 
the discrepancy between their compensation and what riders pay. The new fare system is called ‘route-
based pricing,’ and it charges customers based on what it predicts they’re willing to pay. It’s a break from 
the past, when Uber calculated fares using a combination of mileage, time and multipliers based on 
geographic demand.”). 
11 See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 446 (7th ed. 
2006) (observing that under first-degree price discrimination consumers are “just willing to purchase the 
good”); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
BIG DATA AND DIFFERENTIAL PRICING 4 (Feb. 2015) (associating the term “personalized pricing” with 
first-degree price discrimination). Personalized pricing is also sometimes called tailored pricing, 
individualized pricing, or perfect price discrimination.  
12 See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 306 (1990). An important 
qualification is that personalized pricing may strengthen competition between oligopolists, creating a 
counterbalancing downward pressure on prices. The condition for this to occur is that the substitute 
products sold by the members of the oligopoly not be too different from each other. Lars A. Stole, Price 
Discrimination and Imperfect Competition, 3 HANDBOOK INDUS. ORG. 34, 7 (2003). For a discussion of 
this qualification, see infra note 65. 
13 See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1415–16. Two other options are deconcentration of markets and 
use of big data by government to set prices in all markets. See id. at 1376–77; Ramsi A. Woodcock, 
Personalized Price Regulation as an Income Tax Alternative 5–6 (2019) (working paper on file with 
author). I consider these options in detail elsewhere, but do not address them further in this Article. See 
Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1400–1415; Woodcock, supra note 13, at 49–57 (working paper on file with 
author). Both alternative approaches have the virtue of allowing firms to realize the efficiency benefits 
of personalized pricing while preventing firms from using personalized pricing to extract too much profit 
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the antitrust laws, might at first appear to be the appropriate vehicle, because 
the Act bans certain types of price discrimination.14 But the Robinson-
Patman Act is in fact of little help. The Act targets bulk discounts made by 
manufacturers to large retailers, such as discounts to retail behemoths like 
Walmart or Amazon that put small retailers with low sales volumes at a 
competitive disadvantage.15 But the Act does not apply to the pricing of 
goods sold to consumers, and is rarely enforced even within its limited 
ambit, making it useless as a tool for banning personalized pricing.16 A ban 
on personalized pricing might instead be achieved by new legislation.17 This 
                                                                                                                     
from consumers. See infra Section I.A.2 (discussing the efficiency benefits of personalized pricing). 
Indeed, government exploitation of personalized pricing would even permit use of personalized prices 
efficiently to redistribute wealth in favor of consumers, rather than firms. A ban on personalized pricing 
would not realize the efficiency benefits of personalized pricing, but would prevent firms from using 
personalized pricing to extract excessive profits from consumers. See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1415. 
14 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, . . . either 
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade 
and quality . . . .”); see HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 629 (describing the act as “disguised as an antitrust 
law”). 
15 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 629 (“[Congress was] concerned that small businesses, 
particularly small retailers, were rapidly losing market share to large ‘chain stores’ that were able to 
underbuy and thus to undersell the small operators.”). 
16 See Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 358 (2002) 
(“[T]he Act is not generally believed to apply to consumer transactions[.]”); John B. Kirkwood, 
Reforming the Robinson-Patman Act to Serve Consumers and Control Powerful Buyers, 60 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 358, 375 (2015) (observing that government enforcement has “withered to the point of non-
existence,” with no government case having been brought under the act since 2000). Another limitation 
is that the Act applies only to physical goods. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2018) (prohibiting price 
discrimination only in the sale of “commodities”). 
The inapplicability of the Act to price discrimination in consumer markets arises from the Act’s 
requirement that the effect of the discrimination be to injure competition in some way. Id. (prohibiting 
price discrimination “where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen 
competition”). Price discrimination has this effect in supply markets, because bulk discounts to larger 
retailers make it difficult for small retailers to compete. Cf. Kirkwood, supra note 16, at 359 (lamenting 
the fact that despite this orientation, the Act has not actually been used against large retailers that are 
believed to have a competitive advantage arising from obtaining bulk discounts from suppliers). But in 
consumer markets, price discrimination is a symptom of the absence of competition, not its cause. See 
infra text accompanying note 104. A retailer can personalize prices to consumers only if other retailers 
are unable to undercut those prices. See infra text accompanying note 59. Accordingly, the act of price 
discrimination itself cannot be shown to injure competition in such markets. Like the Robinson-Patman 
Act, the Sherman Act also requires a showing of injury to competition. See, e.g., Somers v. Apple, Inc., 
729 F.3d 953, 963 (9th Cir. 2013); HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 655 (noting that the “antitrust injury” 
requirement applies to “virtually all of the antitrust laws”). It is for this reason that in developing a price 
discrimination claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018), this Article characterizes 
the prevention of resale in aid of price discrimination, rather than price discrimination itself, as the illicit 
conduct that violates the Act. See infra note 22. That approach cannot be taken under the Robinson-
Patman Act because the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination, but not the prevention of 
arbitrage. 
17 Legislatures have a long history of limiting price discrimination though prohibitions on “undue 
discrimination” in pricing contained in rate regulatory regimes. See J. STEPHEN HENDERSON & ROBERT 
E. BURNS, AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF UNDUE PRICE DISCRIMINATION, NAT’L 
REGULATORY RESEARCH INST. 26 (1989) (“One of the most nearly universal obligations imposed by 
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Article shows how, by contrast, the courts might ban personalized pricing 
without new legislation, by interpretation of the prohibition on 
monopolization contained in Section 2 of the Sherman Act.18 
The approach centers on a practice that is key to the viability of 
personalized pricing: the prevention of arbitrage between low- and high-
price units. Personalized pricing is possible only if those consumers charged 
low prices by the firm are unable to resell the units they buy to those 
consumers charged high prices by the firm.19 If resale is possible, then 
resellers compete down the high prices and the price discrimination scheme 
collapses.20 Preventing arbitrage is therefore key to the success of 
personalized pricing. This Article shows that the prevention of arbitrage 
counts as monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act because the 
resellers shut down by the prevention of arbitrage are in effect competitors 
of the firm, and the fact that shutting them down enables the firm to charge 
higher prices to high-price buyers is direct evidence that the firm has 
monopoly power. These two elements—anticompetitive conduct and 
monopoly power—combine with the harm to consumers of personalized 
pricing to make out a complete monopolization claim.21 
The prevention of arbitrage is an example of what antitrust22 calls a 
refusal to deal: the firm engaged in the personalizing of prices refuses to sell 
units to low-price buyers who intend to resell the units to high-price 
buyers.23 Antitrust has traditionally been wary of treating refusals to deal as 
monopolization, even going so far as to recognize a general right of any firm 
to choose with whom to do business and on what terms.24 But there are 
exceptions, and the factors courts have relied upon to grant the exceptions 
                                                                                                                     
state and federal laws on public utilities is the obligation to serve at rates that are not unduly 
discriminatory.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the 
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1070 (1988) (describing the earliest uses of federal power to 
regulate discriminatory rates).    
18 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
19 See KREPS, supra note 12, at 306. 
20 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 626–27, 627 n. 7. 
21 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). For an introduction to antitrust monopolization claims, see RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 193 (2d ed. 2001). Only arbitrage prevention in aid of personalized pricing 
should be treated as monopolization, because consumer harm exists for certain only when prices are 
personalized to equal the maximum that each consumer is willing to pay. See infra text accompanying 
note 97.   
22 “Antitrust” throughout this work means not only the antitrust laws of the United States, but also 
the judges who apply them, the enforcers who enforce them, and the commentators who discuss them. 
For an overview of the law, see POSNER, supra note 21, at 33–43. For an overview of enforcement, see 
ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN 
COMPETITION POLICY 1025–26 (2d ed. 2008). 
23 See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 317–22 (discussing the antitrust law of refusals to 
deal). 
24 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407–8 (2004). 
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apply to the prevention of arbitrage in personalized prices.25 Perhaps the 
most important factor is whether the refusal amounts to the termination of a 
prior profitable course of dealing, a termination that signals to the courts that 
the refusal to deal was motivated by “dreams of monopoly.”26 This factor 
weighs in favor of recognizing an exception to the right to refuse to deal for 
arbitrage prevention, because a price-personalizing firm terminates a prior 
profitable course of selling units to low-price buyers when the firm refuses 
to sell additional units to low-price buyers who intend to resell them.27 
Courts are loath to condemn refusals to deal because the natural remedy 
for a refusal to deal is an order requiring the refuser to start selling to 
competitors.28 Courts shrink from ordering such compelled dealing because 
it requires courts to set the terms of sale, including price, a task the courts 
believe they lack the expertise to carry out successfully.29 But rather than 
remedy arbitrage prevention directly, by ordering dealing, courts can instead 
attack the effects of arbitrage prevention, by ordering firms that prevent 
arbitrage to cease personalizing prices.30 Such a non-personalization remedy 
would preserve the discretion of the firm to set all the usual terms of dealing, 
including price, subject only to the requirement of non-personalization. By 
embracing non-personalization rather than compelled dealing as a remedy, 
the courts would bring the remedy for arbitrage prevention within a core 
judicial competency: the policing of discriminatory behavior.31  
Indeed, the courts should not stop at condemning the prevention of 
arbitrage as monopolization. They should treat the act of personalizing 
prices itself, and not just the act of preventing arbitrage, as the trigger for 
antitrust liability.32 Direct condemnation of personalized pricing is needed, 
because personalized pricing always harms consumers, but firms need not 
always take affirmative steps to prevent arbitrage in order to enable 
personalized pricing, allowing some personalized pricing to escape the 
antitrust dragnet if the prevention of arbitrage alone is the trigger for 
liability. Sometimes consumers charged low prices will fail to avail 
themselves of arbitrage opportunities, even when those opportunities are 
available, whether out of laziness, incompetence, or a lack of interest in 
profit.33 Condemnation of only arbitrage prevention is therefore 
underinclusive, failing to preclude personalized pricing in all cases in which 
                                                                                                                     
25 See infra Section I.C. 
26 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. 
27 See infra text accompanying note 243. 
28 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 339–40. 
29 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08. 
30 See infra Section I.C.4.ii. 
31 See infra text accompanying note 293. 
32 See infra Part II. 
33 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1945) (recognizing 
that firms “may become monopolists by force of accident”). 
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it is possible. 
Fortunately, the courts in recent decades have shown flexibility in 
adapting antitrust’s liability triggers to match the scope of the harm done to 
consumers by anticompetitive conduct.34 Indeed, the courts in recent 
decades have used antitrust’s consumer welfare standard severely to restrict 
the set of conduct that can trigger liability, out of concern that much 
formerly-illicit conduct is not actually harmful to consumers.35 By treating 
personalized pricing as a stand-alone violation of the antitrust laws, the 
courts can seize the opportunity to expand the set of conduct subject to 
antitrust condemnation in an area in which all of that conduct is in fact 
harmful to consumers.  
The charging of different prices to different consumers is a natural part 
of all economic activity: the cost of serving two consumers, even with 
facially identical products, can differ substantially, due to transportation 
costs, for example.36 The argument in this Article is not that a firm must 
charge the same price for everything the firm sells, or face antitrust liability. 
Cost-driven differences in price are good for consumers, ensuring that firms 
can earn enough to engage in production, so cost-driven differences in price 
cannot lead to antitrust liability.37 Rather, the argument here is that antitrust 
can condemn personalized pricing, which is based on the maximum 
willingness to pay of the consumer, rather than the cost of production of the 
firm, because unlike cost-based pricing, personalized pricing always harms 
consumers.38  
To be precise, personalized pricing always harms consumers by design. 
In practice, firms may never learn enough about consumers reliably to 
identify each consumer’s maximum willingness to pay, and as a result 
personalized pricing may in practice never succeed at extracting every last 
penny of value from consumers.39 That would seem to undermine the 
antitrust case against personalized pricing, because imperfectly-executed 
personalized pricing does not have the characteristic of unambiguous harm 
to consumers that is central to the antitrust case against personalized 
pricing.40 If a firm fails to personalize a price equal to the maximum that 
each consumer is willing to pay, then it is possible that the losses to 
                                                                                                                     
34 See infra Part II. 
35 See infra Part II. 
36 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 765–67. 
37 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 11, at 7 (observing that pricing based on the cost of service “can improve economic 
efficiency”). 
38 See infra Section I.A.1. 
39 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 769 (“Perfect price discrimination never exists in the real 
world.”); HAL R. VARIAN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 
29 (2004) (“In reality, price discrimination is never perfect[.]”). 
40 For more on group-based pricing, see infra Section I.A.1. 
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consumers charged higher prices may be offset by the non-zero surplus 
enjoyed by consumers charged lower prices. 
But that presents no real obstacle to the antitrust case against 
personalized pricing, for antitrust liability has always been based on harm 
by design, rather than actual harm. It has never been a defense to a claim of 
monopolization that the bad actor did not in fact succeed at charging higher 
prices to consumers and thereby at inflicting harm upon them.41 The 
dominant firm that engages in anticompetitive conduct violates the Sherman 
Act, whether in the event the firm succeeds at harming competition or not.42 
What matters is that a monopolist has engaged in anticompetitive conduct 
that could in theory give rise to harm, which is precisely what the prevention 
of arbitrage in aid of personalized pricing constitutes. 
This requirement of theoretical harm also explains why traditional, low-
tech forms of personalized pricing, such as street-market haggling, would 
not be swept up by antitrust condemnation of personalized pricing.43 To be 
sure, the aim of these traditional forms is to raise price as high as possible, 
but absent the use of technology—the employment of big data or computer 
algorithms—they cannot possibly be aimed at identifying a determinate 
maximum price that a consumer is willing to pay, and so lack the orientation 
toward perfection, and therefore the theoretic consumer harm, that violates 
the antitrust laws.44 The case against personalized pricing is a case against 
an information-age practice, and is circumscribed accordingly. 
Part I shows that personalized pricing supported by the prevention of 
arbitrage constitutes monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, because the practice inflicts harm on consumers and 
competition, and is always in itself direct evidence of monopoly power. In 
particular, Section I.A shows that the prevention of arbitrage is 
                                                                                                                     
41 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 82 (observing that antitrust allows competitors injured by a 
monopolist’s anticompetitive conduct to sue for lost profits even when consumers have not yet been 
injured as a result of the harm to competition). 
42 See id. at 882. 
43 Cf. What Consumers–and Retailers–Should Know about Dynamic Pricing, 
Knowledge@Wharton, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/what-consumers-and-retailers-
should-know-about-dynamic-pricing/ (“‘Dynamic pricing has always been with us,’ says Wharton 
marketing professor Peter Fader. ‘Think of the classic hagglers in the market of a Middle East bazaar.’”). 
44 The bargaining that takes place in the context of bilateral monopoly—a market in which there is 
but one buyer and one seller—would not run afoul of an antitrust rule against personalized pricing, even 
if carried out with the aid of big data or computer algorithms, because there would be no separate low- 
and high-price buyers between whom the seller might prevent arbitrage. Attempts by sellers individually 
to customize product offerings in order to characterize the market for each unit sold as a bilateral 
monopoly market, and thereby to exploit this loophole, would fail, however, for the reasons set forth in 
Section I.A.4. The antitrust ban on personalized pricing, regardless whether supported by affirmative 
steps to prevent arbitrage, which is proposed in Part II, would, in any event, prevent the seller in a bilateral 
monopoly from using big data or computer algorithms to charge the buyer the maximum that the buyer 
is willing to pay for each unit purchased by the buyer as part of the negotiation. For more on this point, 
see infra note 326.   
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anticompetitive and harmful to consumers, and Section I.B shows that any 
firm that personalizes prices must qualify as having monopoly power for 
purposes of the antitrust laws. Section I.C shows that the right of a firm to 
refuse to deal does not extend to the prevention of arbitrage in aid of 
personalized pricing, and Section I.C.4.ii argues that the most administrable 
remedy for personalized pricing is an order requiring non-discrimination, 
rather than an order to cease the prevention of arbitrage. Part II argues that 
the act of personalizing prices, regardless whether supported by the 
prevention of arbitrage, should trigger antitrust liability. 
I.ARBITRAGE PREVENTION AS MONOPOLIZATION 
In order for a firm to engage in monopolization in violation of Section 2 
of the Sherman Act, the firm must (1) engage in anticompetitive conduct, 
meaning behavior that both harms consumers and causes the market to 
deviate from the perfectly competitive ideal, and (2) have monopoly power, 
meaning that the firm must have the power profitably to raise its prices above 
some measure of its costs.45 A firm that engages in personalized pricing will 
usually meet both criteria.46  
A. Anticompetitive Conduct 
1. Personalized Pricing Harms Consumers 
Personalized pricing satisfies the consumer harm requirement, because 
the charging of a price equal to the maximum that a consumer is willing to 
pay ensures that the consumer derives a vanishingly small benefit from the 
transaction.47 The total gain from trade between the firm and the consumer 
is the benefit conferred by the product on the consumer—measured by the 
maximum price that the consumer is willing to pay for the product—less the 
harm suffered by the firm to produce the product—measured by the firm’s 
production costs, including the cost of providing investors with a reasonable 
return on investment.48 The price the firm charges for the product splits the 
gain from trade, by forcing the consumer to compensate the firm for its 
production costs and, if the price exceeds those production costs, to pay out 
to the firm some of the additional benefit conferred by the product on the 
                                                                                                                     
45 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 
at 292. The monopoly power requirement is also sometimes called the “market power” or “dominance” 
requirement. Compare id. at 292–93 (market power), with GAVIL ET AL., supra note 22, at 583 
(monopoly, dominance). 
46 The exception is when arbitrage fails to take place even though the firm has taken no steps to 
prevent it, and the firm is therefore able to personalize prices without engaging in anticompetitive 
conduct. See infra Part II. 
47 See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 446. 
48 See id. at 251, 260, 409–10. 
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consumer.49 It follows that a price personalized to equal the consumer’s 
maximum willingness to pay forces the consumer to pay out the entire gain 
from trade to the firm.50 In practice, firms will personalize prices equal to a 
vanishingly small amount less than the maximum the consumer is willing to 
pay. When the price equals the maximum that the consumer is willing to 
pay, the consumer is technically indifferent between buying and not buying 
at all, because the price just equals the value the consumer places on the 
product. Firms set prices slightly below maximum willingness to pay in 
order to be sure that consumers will buy.51 But the infinitesimal gain to 
consumers from being induced to buy might as well be zero.52 Personalizing 
prices has the extraordinary characteristic of charging consumers prices so 
high that consumers are rendered no better off—more or less—than if they 
had made no purchases at all.53  
For example, if the maximum a consumer is willing to pay for a Coke is 
$2.51, and Coca-Cola spends $0.25 to produce a Coke, then the gains from 
trade with the consumer are $2.26. If Coca-Cola personalizes a price equal 
to $2.50 to the consumer—a penny below the consumer’s maximum 
willingness to pay, in order to ensure that the consumer will buy—then 
Coca-Cola takes virtually all of the gains from trade, or $2.25, because Coca-
Cola generates $2.50 in revenues less Coca-Cola’s $0.25 production cost. 
The consumer still buys, because at $2.50 the price does not exceed the 
consumer’s maximum willingness to pay, but the consumer’s gain of one 
penny from buying the Coke is very small. By contrast, if Coca-Cola were 
to charge $0.26 for a Coke, which is a price at which Coca-Cola will produce 
and sell Coke because it affords Coke a profit of one penny, the consumer 
would enjoy a net gain from the transaction of $2.25. That is the value the 
consumer places on the Coke of $2.51, less the purchase price of $0.26. The 
consumer would therefore capture virtually all of the gains available from 
trade. The margin between the cost of production and the maximum the 
consumer is willing to pay is called surplus, the difference between price 
and cost is the firm’s share of that surplus, also called profit, and the 
difference between the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay and price 
is the consumer’s share of the surplus, also called consumer surplus. By 
                                                                                                                     
49 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 6 (showing how producer and consumer surplus are determined 
by the price charged). 
50 See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 446. 
51 See id. at 10–109, 446 (observing that at a consumer’s reservation price, the consumer is 
indifferent between buying and not buying); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND 
OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 497 (4th ed. 1977) (“[E]very consumer gets out of each transaction something 
more than he pays for the item he purchases. This must be so because no one forces him to make a 
purchase.” (emphasis omitted)).  
52 See AMIR ALEXANDER, INFINITESIMAL 9 (2014) (observing that it is a paradox of the vanishingly 
small that it at once has magnitude and its “size is zero”). 
53 See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1390. 
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driving price up almost to willingness to pay, personalized pricing 
guarantees that the firm captures virtually the entire gain from trade as 
profits, and drives consumer surplus as close to zero as possible.54 
Without personalized pricing, consumers always have a chance of 
capturing some of the gain from trade, and consequently the imposition of 
personalized pricing harms consumers, by eliminating their access to that 
gain.55 In the absence of personalized pricing, firms can at best charge group-
based, rather than personalized, prices, and group-based prices always leave 
some consumers with a gain from trade, because a group-based price must 
be the same for all members of the group.56 Unless the profit-maximizing 
price to charge to the group happens to be the price that only the highest-
maximum-willingness-to-pay member is willing to pay—and that will not 
be the case if the gain to the firm from selling to an additional group member 
exceeds the loss from reducing price to the highest-maximum-willingness-
to-pay member that will not be the case—the uniform price charged to the 
group must be below the maximum willingness to pay of at least one group 
member, and possibly more.57 Those lucky group members who pay a price 
below the maximum they are willing to pay—known as “inframarginal” 
consumers—enjoy a consumer surplus. Only the lowest-maximum-
willingness-to-pay member of the group among those to whom the firm 
sells—called the “marginal” consumer—pays a price equal to the 
consumer’s maximum willingness to pay and therefore enjoys no consumer 
surplus. When firms switch to personalized pricing, the consumer surpluses 
available to all but the marginal consumer under group-based pricing go 
away, and so consumers are harmed.58  
The extent of the harm inflicted by personalized pricing depends, 
however, on the prevailing level of competition between substitute products 
in the market.59 For the maximum willingness of each consumer to pay for 
a product always depends on the value the consumer places on the 
                                                                                                                     
54 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 6, 769. 
55 See Stole, supra note 12, at 3–4, 6 (observing that under second- and third-degree price 
discrimination consumers can retain some surplus). This point is discussed in greater depth infra in the 
text accompanying note 86. 
56 See id. at 3–4. 
57 See id. at 4 (observing that if there is some “heterogeneity [in the preferences of group members,] 
third-degree price discrimination will leave some consumer surplus”). 
58 To be sure, a firm will price some consumers out of the market under group-based pricing if 
lowering the group’s price to meet their maximum willingness to pay does not result in a gain for the 
firm that offsets the lost revenue from selling to the group’s inframarginal consumers at a lower price. 
But, as discussed more fully below, those consumers who are priced out of the market would enjoy only 
a vanishingly small consumer surplus under personalized pricing, so the switch to personalized pricing 
confers virtually no gain upon them. See infra Section I.A.2. 
59 See Stole, supra note 12, at 6–8. 
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alternative products offered by the firm’s competitors.60 Personalized 
pricing allows firms to raise prices up to the maxima that consumers are 
willing to pay, but the level of competition in the market—the appeal of 
competing products to consumers and the prices charged by their makers—
determines how high or low a consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for 
the firm’s product will be.61 Cola buyers, for example, may prefer Coke to 
Pepsi, and be willing to pay a quarter or two more for a Coke than a Pepsi, 
but if Coke raises prices by more than, say, fifty cents, those buyers will buy 
Pepsi instead. By contrast, if there were no alternative to Coke on the market, 
those buyers would likely be willing to put up with greater price increases—
perhaps a dollar or two—before eventually giving up on the purchase of cola 
altogether and buying cheaper, but less preferred, substitutes, like water. 
Personalized pricing will therefore extract more value from Coke buyers in 
a cola market monopolized by Coke than it will in a market contested by 
Pepsi, because without Pepsi as a backstop, consumers have more to gain 
from trade with Coke, and Coke therefore has more gain to extract through 
personalized pricing. 
The relationship between competition and maximum willingness to pay 
means that the harm inflicted by personalized pricing on consumers can be 
tempered by making markets more competitive.62 But it does not mean that 
in some, more competitive, markets the adoption of personalized pricing 
cannot harm consumers at all, whereas only in other, less competitive, 
markets will personalized pricing inflict harm. So long as competitors sell 
differentiated products, each product will have its loyalists—those willing 
to pay more for the product than others—and that will allow firms to use 
personalized pricing to eliminate the consumer surpluses their loyalists 
enjoy under group-based pricing.63 The more competitive the market, the 
less profit the firm will be able to extract via personalized pricing, because 
consumers’ loyalties will be weaker, but the opportunity to extract more 
profit—and to harm consumers—by adopting personalized pricing will 
                                                                                                                     
60 See id. at 7 (“[C]onsumers may . . . obtain considerable non-residual surplus from the presence 
of competition.”). 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A RE-
ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 67 (7th ed. 1956) (“As long as the substitutes are to any degree 
imperfect, he still has a monopoly of his own product and control over its price within the limits imposed 
upon any monopolist — those of the demand.”); HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 131–32, 623 (“If a price 
discrimination scheme is profitable at least some purchasers will be paying more than marginal cost for 
the product, and this necessitates at least a modest amount of market power as to them. However, . . . the 
amount of market power need not be great and often is no more than that which results from product 
differentiation . . . . For example, even tiny airlines in intense competition with larger rivals price 
discriminate in filling their seats. They charge widely different prices to different classes of passengers 
notwithstanding that the cost of serving them is roughly the same.”). 
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never go away.64 Personalized pricing is therefore always, inherently, 
harmful to consumers, regardless the level of competition in markets.65 
                                                                                                                     
64 See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 67; HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 131–32, 623. 
65 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 627 (“All forms of persistent price discrimination transfer 
wealth away from consumers and toward sellers. If antitrust policy is concerned with such wealth 
transfers, then price discrimination presents an antitrust problem.”). Sometimes, personalized pricing can 
itself trigger additional competition that may counteract personalized pricing’s harmful effects on 
consumers. See Stole, supra note 12, at 7.  
For example, consider the following competitive market, initially without personalized pricing. 
Suppose that in this market a consumer places a $6 value on a box of a particular brand of cookie, and 
that the current price is $2. Suppose, further, that the consumer places a $5 value on a competing brand 
of cookie, which also happens to retail at a price of $2. The maker of the second box of cookies might 
well know that the consumer will buy the first box, because the surplus the consumer derives from 
purchasing the first box ($6 less the price of $2) exceeds the surplus the consumer derives from 
purchasing the second box ($5 less the price of $2), but if the maker of the second box must charge 
uniform prices, at least to certain groups of consumers, the maker of the second box may be unable to 
compete for the consumer’s business. Lowering the price of the box to $0.50, which would induce the 
consumer to buy from the second maker (because now the consumer’s surplus of $4.50 would exceed 
the $4 of surplus associated with purchase of cookies from the first maker), might force the second maker 
to reduce output, because although the cost to the second maker of producing a box for this consumer 
might only be $0.25, the cost of producing boxes of cookies for others might be $1.50, and a new uniform 
price of $0.50 would make production of those units unprofitable. Overall, the decline in output might 
reduce profits, even if it permitted sale of one new box of cookies to this particular consumer. 
But now suppose that personalized pricing is possible. The second maker could lower the price 
charged for the particular box sold to the consumer down to $0.50, but keep the prices the firm charges 
for other boxes up above their production cost of $1.50, ensuring that the firm would not be forced to 
reduce output and overall profits in order to compete for the consumer’s business. If the first maker were 
to personalize prices as well, and therefore would not need to reduce prices on all units in order to reduce 
the price charged to the consumer for a box of cookies, then the first maker would respond to the price 
cut by the second maker with a price cut of its own, perhaps down to $1.25 (assuming that the first 
maker’s cost of production of the particular box of cookies that the first maker wishes to sell to the 
consumer, like the second maker’s cost, is only $0.25). The second maker now could not respond with 
an additional price cut, because to confer on the consumer a greater surplus than what the consumer 
would get from purchasing the first box at $1.25, the second maker would need to charge a price below 
the second maker’s production cost of $0.25, making an additional price cut unprofitable. But the 
consumer would nevertheless have benefitted from the advent of personalized pricing in this competitive 
market, because the competition made possible by personalized pricing would have driven the price paid 
by the consumer for the first box down from $2 to $1.25. 
(Absent such competitive effects, the harm of personalized pricing to consumers is of course 
straightforward, because then personalized pricing leads only to a raising of prices up to each consumer’s 
maximum willingness to pay. Suppose that, to keep the consumer from buying cookies from the second 
maker, the first maker under uniform pricing had been unable to raise the uniform cookie price above $2 
for the firm’s other customers, even though those customers value a box of cookies at $10 and would 
therefore be willing to pay up to $7 before preferring to buy the second maker’s cookies (which these 
customers value at $5) at a price of $2. Personalized pricing would allow the first maker to raise price to 
$7 for its other customers, without raising price to the consumer who only places a value of $6 on the 
cookies. Those other customers are therefore badly harmed by the advent of personalized pricing. 
Moreover, if the second maker is unable to lower prices—even with personalized pricing technology—
because the second maker’s production costs for all units is $2, for example, instead of $0.25 or $1.50, 
then there will be no personalized price competition to sell to the consumer that might offset the harm 
caused by the charging of higher prices to other customers.)  
The fact that the introduction of personalized pricing could increase the level of competition in the 
market, and that increase might result in a partial or complete offset of the consumer-harmful effects of 
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2. The Principal Economic Defenses of Price Discrimination Ignore 
the Harmfulness of Personalized Pricing to Consumers  
This result contrasts with the generally favorable way in which 
economists treat personalized pricing, a contrast that has three sources. First, 
when economists celebrate personalized pricing, they celebrate not the 
effects of personalized pricing on consumers, but the effects of personalized 
pricing on overall surplus, inclusive of both firm profits and consumer 
surplus, which is sometimes called total surplus.66 Firms that do not 
personalize prices charge group-based prices instead, meaning different 
prices to different groups of consumers, but uniform prices to all consumers 
within a given group. In an effort to raise prices to consumers in a particular 
group who are willing to pay more, firms may charge within-group uniform 
                                                                                                                     
personalized pricing, cannot, however, serve as the basis for an argument that personalized pricing can 
be good for consumers. For at the new level of competition created by personalized pricing, each firm 
will use personalized pricing to charge the highest possible prices—given the new, more competitive 
environment—to consumers. And that in turn means that personalized pricing minimizes the benefit to 
consumers of whatever greater level of competition personalized pricing makes possible. That in turn 
means that consumers are better off achieving any given level of competition through a combination of 
uniform pricing and greater antitrust enforcement aimed at improving the overall competitive dynamic 
in the market, than through the application of personalized pricing. 
In other words, if personalized pricing happens to promote competition, the first cookie maker will 
charge $1.25 after competing on personalized prices with the second cookie maker, not the $1.00, or even 
$0.25, that the first maker could afford to charge given its costs. And personalized pricing will allow the 
first maker to maintain that $1.25 price even if the firm must charge lower prices to other customers to 
compete for their business against different rivals. Compare that to a world in which, starting with the 
original uniform prices charged by the cookie makers, antitrust authorities were to promote competition 
in the market, perhaps by compelling the first maker to disclose its secret recipe to competitors and 
forcing the first maker to turn its production facilities into an open platform. The second maker, whose 
inferior recipe was only valued at $5 by the consumer, and whose production costs on some units were 
as high as $1.50, in excess of the $0.25 cost of production of the first firm, could now produce cookies 
with a $6 value to the consumer (and with an even greater value to others) at the same cost as the first 
firm. Because now the second firm would be offering a product that the first firm’s customers value as 
highly as the first firm’s product, competition would drive the uniform price of the cookies sold by both 
firms down to production cost of $0.25, and because prices would be uniform, all customers would gain, 
making consumers as a group much better off than under the competition that arrives incidental to the 
adoption of personalized pricing. 
Personalized pricing may have procompetitive effects, but whatever level of competition 
personalized pricing may make possible, personalized pricing always ensures that consumers enjoy the 
smallest possible benefit from that level of competition. Which is why, for any given level of competition, 
the use of personalized pricing instead of uniform pricing inflicts an unambiguous harm on consumers. 
For an additional example, and elaboration upon this point, see Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Sixth and 
Seventh of the FTC’s Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, and 
Specifically, How Algorithmic and Data-Driven Pricing Exacerbate The Consumer Harm Associated 
with Market Power and Give the FTC a Mandate to More Vigorously Enforce the Antitrust Laws, The 
Seventh Session of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s Hearings on Competition and Consumer 
Protection in the 21st Century 4–5 (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2019/01/ftc-2018-0101-d-0007-
163726.pdf. 
66 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 21, at 80 n.37; VARIAN, supra note 11, at 445–47.  
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prices that price low-willingness-to-pay consumers out of the market 
entirely, even when those low-willingness-to-pay consumers would be 
willing to pay prices that cover the costs of producing the product for them.67 
An airline charging a uniform price to the group consisting of last-minute 
fliers prefers to let some seats go unfilled, for example, even though the 
marginal cost of providing access to those remaining seats is near zero, in 
order to charge a higher price to the last-minute fliers who do still buy at 
higher prices.68 That reduces total surplus, by precluding purchases by fliers 
who have a low willingness to pay, but who are nevertheless willing to pay 
more than the costs of production.69 Economists celebrate personalized 
pricing because the practice breaks this tradeoff between profits and total 
surplus.70 Personalized pricing allows firms to charge high prices to those 
with a high willingness to pay and low prices to those with a low willingness 
to pay, allowing the firm to profit without pricing low-willingness-to-pay 
consumers out of the market and therefore without reducing total surplus.71  
While personalized pricing may produce more total surplus than does 
group-based pricing, personalized pricing does not, however, produce more 
consumer surplus than does group-based pricing. Indeed, personalized 
                                                                                                                     
67 See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 429–33. 
68 See Lucinda Shen, We Asked the Experts: Is It Cheaper to Book a Flight Last Minute?, MONEY 
(Aug. 3, 2017), http://money.com/money/4868436/are-flights-cheaper-last-minute/. 
69 The reduction in total welfare is sometimes called “deadweight loss.” See HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 1, at 20, 86. 
70 See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 445–47. 
71 See id. Economists recognize, however, that personalized pricing can induce firms to overinvest 
in product development in pursuit of the greater profits associated with the personalized pricing of a 
product relative to the uniform pricing of the product, and that this overinvestment can reduce total 
surplus, by converting some of that surplus into increased, and unnecessary, research and development 
costs. See Vincenzo Denicolò, Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?, 22 ECON. POL’Y 680, 690 
(2007) (modeling the relationship between expected profits and research and development expenditure). 
By increasing profits, personalized pricing may also cause firms to waste resources, and reduce total 
surplus, in trying to harm sellers of competing substitute products in order to protect those higher profits. 
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 772–73. These problems temper the positive effect of personalized 
pricing on total surplus. A further tempering effect comes from the cost of implementing and maintaining 
personalized pricing itself. The acquisition and analysis of consumer data, not to mention the creation of 
an information technology infrastructure that permits the delivery of personalized prices to consumers, 
are all necessary to implement personalized pricing, and these are costly, further reducing total surplus. 
Economists also recognize that price discrimination can impose search costs on consumers, as 
consumers seek to avoid the high end of the firm’s pricing schedule and to find units sold by the firm at 
the low end of that schedule. See Varian, supra note 4, at 33. These costs reduce total surplus. There 
should be no search costs associated with the peculiar form of price discrimination that is personalized 
pricing, however, because the firm’s ability accurately to identify each consumer and charge that 
consumer a personalized price implies that consumers will be unable to take steps to escape the prices 
personalized to them and so will not waste resources attempting to do so. But to the extent that firms’ 
technology is imperfect, and they succeed only at approximating personalized pricing, there may be scope 
for consumers to take steps to confuse personalized pricing systems—and obtain lower prices thereby—
and the resources that consumers expend on doing so would count as a cost of personalized pricing and 
would therefore further reduce total surplus.   
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pricing drives consumer surplus almost to zero. Because consumer surplus, 
and not total surplus, matters to antitrust, economists’ ardor for the total-
surplus-expanding effects of personalized pricing is quite irrelevant to 
antitrust policy and obscures the conflict between personalized pricing and 
antitrust’s mission to protect consumer welfare.72 The aim of personalized 
pricing is to set the prices charged to all buyers, including low-willingness-
to-pay buyers, as close as possible to the maximum that each buyer is willing 
to pay, ensuring that the surplus enjoyed by each buyer, including any low-
willingness-to-pay buyer who is able for the first time to buy as a result of 
the personalization, is nearly zero.73 However much personalized pricing 
may expand total surplus, personalized pricing ensures that the entire 
expansion in surplus goes to firms in the form of profits, along with any 
share of the existing surplus that consumers would have enjoyed under 
group-based pricing. To return to the airfare example, personalized pricing 
fills every last seat on the plane, in stark contrast to group-based pricing, but 
each passenger pays such a high personalized price that each passenger feels 
that the price is so high that the trip is very nearly not worthwhile. That is 
true no matter how urgent the passenger’s need to travel, because 
personalized prices adjust to reflect the urgency that each passenger places 
on the trip. Because antitrust’s mission is to protect consumer surplus, not 
total surplus, a practice that increases the gains from trade, but allows only 
firms, and not consumers, to capture those gains, merits no antitrust 
deference.74 
The second source of the generally favorable treatment of personalized 
pricing by economists is the belief of some economists that the greater 
ability to extract value from consumers made possible by personalized 
pricing may be necessary to allow firms to cover their costs of production, 
particularly large fixed costs.75 This cost-coverage view is closely related to 
the view, just discussed, that personalized pricing permits firms to sell to 
buyers who might otherwise be priced out of the market.76 According to the 
                                                                                                                     
72 See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1389–90; HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 769 (“[F]irst degree 
price discrimination is often said to be as efficient as perfect competition, even though one result of 
perfect price discrimination is that customers are far poorer and the seller far richer.”). 
73 See supra Section I.A.1.  
74 See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting 
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 196 (2008); Steven C. Salop, 
Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare 
Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 336–38 (2010). 
75 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The 
opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period— is what attracts ‘business acumen’ 
in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.”); Jonathan B. 
Baker, Evaluating Appropriability Defenses for the Exclusionary Conduct of Dominant Firms in 
Innovative Industries, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 435–38 (2016) (discussing the relevant economic 
literature) (sources cited therein). 
76 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 769. 
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cost-coverage view, firms with very high fixed costs may not be able to 
generate enough revenue through group-based pricing in order to cover their 
costs.77 Personalized pricing provides a solution, the argument goes, by 
allowing the firm both to extract additional revenues from inframarginal 
consumers and to bring more consumers into the market and extract further 
revenues from them as well.78 
The trouble with this view is that it is not clear that group-based pricing 
is actually unable to cover all the fixed costs of production.79 The assumption 
that group-based pricing cannot cover costs implies that the economy as it 
exists today, on the eve of the personalization of prices, is under-investing 
in production.80 But there is no reason to suppose that is so.81 Preventing 
personalized pricing from spreading across the economy would not reduce 
the revenues available to firms to cover costs, but only prevent an expansion 
in those revenues.82 To defend personalized pricing on cost-coverage 
grounds therefore requires an argument in favor of expanding the revenues 
available to firms relative to current levels, an argument that has not for the 
most part been made.83  
The third source of the generally favorable treatment of personalized 
pricing by economists is that economists usually mean imperfect, or third-
degree, price discrimination when they celebrate personalized pricing, rather 
than true personalized pricing, which economists call first-degree, or perfect, 
price discrimination.84 Third-degree price discrimination, which is almost 
universal today, is group-based pricing: the division of consumers into 
groups and the charging of uniform prices tailored to extract the maximum 
profit from each group.85 Economists like third-degree price discrimination 
                                                                                                                     
77 See Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Price Discrimination and Product Differentiation in Economic 
Theory: An Early Analysis, 84 Q.J. ECON. 268, 269–70 (1970). 
78 See id. 
79 See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1402–03. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 But see William D. Nordhaus, Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and 
Measurement, Working Paper No. 10433 22 (2004) (concluding that only 2.8% of gains from innovation 
are captured by firms); Denicolò, supra note 71, at 712–13 (suggesting that patents under-reward 
innovators). 
84 See Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley, Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust 
Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 612 (2003). 
85 See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 279 (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) (4th ed. 1932) 
(“A third degree would obtain if the monopolist were able to distinguish among his customers n different 
groups, separated from one another more or less by some practicable mark, and could charge a separate 
monopoly price to the members of each group.” (emphasis omitted)). For the prevalence of third-degree 
price discrimination, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 767 (“Sporadic price discrimination is an 
everyday occurrence in competitive markets.”); Varian, supra note 4, at 3 (describing third-degree price 
discrimination as “perhaps the most common form of price discrimination; examples are student 
discounts, or charging different prices on different days of the week”). This prevalence is particularly 
clear given that second-degree price discrimination should count as a form of third-degree price 
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because it has the potential to increase consumer surplus relative to uniform 
pricing across all consumers of a product.86 Suppose, for example, that a 
firm becomes able to segment its market into two groups of consumers: 
those who currently buy at the prevailing uniform price and those who are 
willing to pay the cost of producing additional units of the product but who 
cannot afford to buy the product at the prevailing price. The firm might then 
start to charge two prices, the old price to existing customers, and a new 
lower price to low-willingness-to-pay customers designed to induce some of 
them to start buying the product. Because, in a third-degree-price-
discrimination scheme, the firm will charge the new lower price uniformly 
to all the members of the low-willingness-to-pay group, some inframarginal 
consumers within that group will enjoy a consumer surplus at that new lower 
price.87 Because the existing consumers continue to pay the same price as 
before, their consumer surplus will not change, and so the aggregate 
consumer surplus enjoyed by all consumers will increase thanks to 
implementation of the third-degree price discrimination scheme. Of course, 
the firm may find it profitable to take advantage of the firm’s power to 
segment high-willingness-to-pay consumers into a separate group to raise 
the price charged to that group, instead of keeping it unchanged.88 That 
would drive some high-willingness-to-pay consumers out of the market, 
eliminating their consumer surplus, and would further reduce the consumer 
surplus of the inframarginal high-willingness-to-pay consumers who remain 
in the market.89 These consumer surplus reductions might offset the gains in 
consumer surplus associated with the lower price charged to low-
willingness-to-pay consumers.90 But gains remain possible, making 
economists reluctant to condemn third-degree price discrimination out of 
                                                                                                                     
discrimination. Second-degree price discrimination is a seller’s structuring of a product or price schedule 
to induce consumers to self-sort based on willingness to pay. See Stole, supra note 12, at 4. It ought to 
be treated as a subcategory of third-degree price discrimination because the self-sorting induced by the 
practice results in group-based pricing. The only difference between second-degree price discrimination 
and archetypical third-degree price discrimination is that in second-degree price discrimination the price 
charged, or product offered, to group members is constrained by the need to use the price or product as 
a sorting mechanism.  
86 See Klein & Wiley, supra note 84, at 612. This point is also discussed briefly supra in the text 
accompanying note 55 . 
87 See Kathleen Carroll & Dennis Coates, Teaching Price Discrimination: Some Clarification, 66 
S. ECON. J. 466, 472 (1999) (stating that under third-degree price discrimination “the group members 
will derive consumer surplus . . . that the firm cannot extract”); Varian, supra note 4, at 3 (observing that 
under third-degree price discrimination within-group prices are constant). For the definition of 
inframarginal consumers, see supra text accompanying note 57. 
88 See Klein & Wiley, supra note 84, at 612. 
89 See id. 
90 See Carroll & Coates, supra note 87, at 472–73 (stating that third-degree price discrimination 
may be “not only less efficient than first-degree price discrimination, it is also less efficient than no price 
discrimination”). 
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hand.91 
Personalized pricing lacks third-degree price discrimination’s potential 
to benefit consumers because under personalized pricing low-willingness-
to-pay consumers who are brought into the market for the first time by the 
personalization of prices enjoy almost no consumer surplus. Firms 
personalize prices as close as possible to the maximum willingness to pay of 
each consumer, including the low-willingness-to-pay consumer who is 
priced into the market, and so personalized pricing generates no gains for 
new, low-willingness-to-pay consumers with which to offset the losses of 
inframarginal consumers who would have bought at a non-personalized 
price.92 Under personalized pricing, all consumers pay the highest possible 
prices and enjoy almost no consumer surplus.93 As advances in information 
technology allow firms to segment consumers and their purchases into 
increasingly small groups, the third-degree price discrimination prevalent 
today will come increasingly to resemble personalized pricing.94 At each 
step, consumer surplus may rise, or fall, because the effects of third-degree 
price discrimination are ambiguous, but at the last step, from a uniform price 
charged across two purchases to a unique price charged for a single purchase 
alone, consumer surplus must fall, and fall to zero.95 That step, from a world 
of group-based, uniform pricing, to personalized pricing, unambiguously 
harms consumers.96    
To ensure that in hastening to condemn personalized pricing antitrust 
does not preclude third-degree price discrimination, and its potential benefits 
to consumers, courts must require plaintiffs challenging personalized pricing 
under Section 2 to prove that the defendant is personalizing prices to 
individual consumers on a unit basis.97 In general, evidence of 
                                                                                                                     
91 See Klein & Wiley, supra note 84, at 612. 
92 See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 445–47. 
93 See supra Section I.A.1. 
94 See Niejadlik, supra note 6, at 3 (“Rather than relying on static product bundles at pre-determined 
prices, we envision a system that develops a customized offer at the right price for each customer. To 
realize this vision, fundamental changes are necessary in the way we approach pricing, revenue 
management, and merchandizing. These systems must move beyond industry constraints and rigid data 
silos to become more flexible and utilize new technologies to be successful.”). 
95 For the effect of personalized pricing on consumer surplus, see supra Section I.A.1. Third-degree 
price discrimination transforms into personalized pricing only once firms are able to segment consumers 
into groups of one for each individual unit purchased by the consumer and to charge a personalized price 
for each such unit. If each consumer buys only one unit of a particular good, prices for that good are 
personalized once firms succeed at segmenting consumers into groups of one. When consumers buy 
multiple units of a particular good, however, personalized pricing exists only if each consumer is charged 
the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for each unit that the consumer buys. See Klein & Wiley, 
supra note 84, at 612. In this multiple-unit-per-individual-consumer context, segmenting consumers into 
groups of one will not be enough to achieve personalized pricing, so long as the consumer is still charged 
a uniform price for all units that the consumer purchases.  
96 See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 445–47. 
97 For the significance of personalizing prices for each unit sold, see supra note 95. 
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personalization will not be hard to find in cases in which the activity is 
genuinely taking place. Personalized pricing requires the use of information 
technology to identify the consumer at the point of sale and the use of 
datasets to determine the consumer’s reservation prices.98 This requires a 
substantial infrastructure that is difficult to hide.99 Personalization can also 
be inferred from data on the actual prices charged by a firm for different 
units of the same product.100  
Additional proof that the defendant is tailoring prices to the maximum 
that consumers are willing to pay, as opposed to some more equitable price 
level, should not be required, however, because any profit-maximizing firm 
will seek to charge the highest possible prices, and when prices are set on a 
personalized basis, the highest possible prices are the maximum prices that 
consumers are willing to pay.101 Of course, in the absence of perfect 
information on consumers, firms will fail always to charge the absolute 
maximum that each consumer is willing to pay, but the fact that a firm has 
chosen to charge a personalized price for each unit is evidence that the firm’s 
goal is to charge a price equal to the consumer’s willingness to pay and 
therefore evidence enough of consumer-harmful conduct for antitrust 
purposes.102 
3. Arbitrage Prevention Harms Competition 
There is a long and perhaps legitimate tradition in antitrust, and 
economics more generally, of thinking of price as a byproduct of the level 
                                                                                                                     
98 For an example of the data and econometric methods required to attempt personalized pricing, 
see BENJAMIN REED SHILLER, FIRST-DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION USING BIG DATA 1–4 (Apr. 9, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://benjaminshiller.com/images/First_Degree_PD_Using_Big_Data_Apr_8,_2014.pdf; Niejadlik, 
supra note 6, at 11 (observing that personalized pricing will require “new advances and techniques in 
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning” as well as “massive amounts of historical behavioral 
data”). 
99 See Lynn DeLain & Edward O’Meara, Building a Business Case for Revenue Management, 2 J. 
REVENUE & PRICING MGMT. 368, 370 (2004) (discussing the systems required for implementing a 
“revenue management” system of the kind used by the hospitality industry and estimating costs as 
ranging from $3 million to $10 million in the first two years). 
100 Of course, any differences would have to be adjusted for differences in production cost. See 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 765 (“[T]echnically, two sales are discriminatory when they have different 
ratios of price to marginal cost.”). But in some cases, such as when consumers buy multiple units of a 
good at the same time, cost differences can be presumed small and information on unit-by-unit price 
differences may be sufficient for an inference of personalized pricing.  
101 See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 446. Antitrust makes a similar assumption about the height of the 
uniform prices charged by cartels and monopolies. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 57 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]f monopoly power has been acquired or maintained through improper means, the 
fact that the power has not been used to extract [a monopoly price] provides no succor to the monopolist.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222–23 
(1940) (declaring “immaterial” to a price fixing violation whether prices were “fixed at the fair going 
market price”). 
102 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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of competition in markets, rather than as a cause.103 According to this view, 
competition constrains prices, not the other way around, and so it follows 
that a mere pricing practice, such as personalized pricing, cannot harm 
competition (with notable exceptions not relevant here).104 If a pricing 
practice harms consumers, the argument goes, that can only be because 
competition is failing to drive prices down, and if antitrust wishes to solve 
the problem, antitrust must target any anticompetitive practices that have 
undermined competition, rather than the pricing practice itself.105 According 
to this view, antitrust should treat the competitive disease, not the pricing 
symptom. This view precludes a monopolization claim targeting 
personalized pricing itself, but does not prevent a monopolization claim 
targeting the underlying anticompetitive practice that makes personalized 
pricing possible.106  
That underlying anticompetitive practice is the prevention of 
arbitrage.107 In order for personalized pricing to work, the firm must be able 
to prevent low-willingness-to-pay consumers, to whom the firm charges low 
prices, from making profits by reselling the units they buy from the firm at 
low prices to consumers who are willing to pay high prices and who would 
otherwise buy at high personalized prices directly from the firm.108 By 
charging these “high-price consumers” only very slightly less than the high 
prices that the firm would personalize to them, the “low-price consumers” 
engaged in resale can induce high-price consumers to buy resold units, rather 
than units sold directly by the firm, while still earning a profit.109 If the firm 
fails to prevent this “arbitrage” of its personalized prices, then high-price 
                                                                                                                     
103 See POSNER, supra note 21, at 113–15. 
104 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 322 (“Antitrust . . . is designed to be a market alternative to 
price regulation, not merely price regulation by another name.”). The most notable exception is below-
cost, also known as predatory, pricing. See generally id. at 370–410 (discussing “predatory and other 
exclusionary pricing”). 
105 See POSNER, supra note 21, at 114 (arguing that if “exclusionary practices” are the cause of 
“supracompetitive prices” then “the practices can be enjoined or punished”). 
106 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 316 (“Most price discrimination is concerned with extraction, 
not exclusion. That is, its purpose and generally its effect is not to exclude anyone from the market, but 
rather to enable a seller to earn higher profits . . . .”). Price discrimination has been treated as in itself 
anticompetitive conduct at least once, in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. 
Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), but the anticompetitive effects at issue in that case 
are distinct from the effects of personalized pricing that are the subject of this Article. See infra text 
accompanying note 226. For the argument that antitrust should treat the personalization of prices itself 
as a standalone violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, though not as a violation of Section 2’s 
prohibition on monopolization, see infra Part II.  
107 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 148 (“[A]rbitrage occurs when the buyers who pay a low 
price resell the product to buyers asked to pay a high price. If the monopolist cannot prevent arbitrage, 
then price discrimination may not work.”); Marius Schwartz, Third-Degree Price Discrimination and 
Output: Generalizing a Welfare Result, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1259, 1260 (1990) (stating that “with perfect 
arbitrage, of course, price discrimination would be impossible”). 
108 See KREPS, supra note 12, at 306. 
109 See POSNER, supra note 21, at 83. 
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consumers will not buy from the firm, but instead from low-price consumers 
acting as resellers.110 All consumer demand will be satisfied through sales of 
the firm’s product to low-price consumers, part of which product will be 
consumed by low-price consumers and part resold to high-price 
consumers.111 The firm will therefore effectively find itself selling its entire 
inventory at the lowest price the firm personalizes to consumers, and will 
therefore give up on personalized pricing and revert to uniform pricing, 
which will allow the firm to choose a higher uniform price at which to sell 
its product.112 The firm cannot prevent arbitrage simply by refusing to sell 
at all to low-price consumers, because then the firm would sell the product 
only at the high price to high-price consumers, and the firm would then no 
longer be engaged in personalized pricing.113 The only way for the firm to 
prevent arbitrage is to sell at the low price to low-price consumers only in 
an amount equal to the low-price consumers’ personal needs and to refuse 
to sell any additional units that low-price consumers might use for resale. 
This refusal of the firm to permit low-price consumers to buy for the purpose 
of resale is the anticompetitive conduct that brings personalized pricing 
within the ambit of the antitrust laws.114 
Personalized pricing itself in fact constitutes a refusal to sell to low-price 
consumers for resale, making personalized pricing at once a symptom of 
competitive disease and the disease itself.115 Personalized pricing amounts 
to a refusal to sell for resale because truly personalized prices must 
automatically adjust upward to account for a buyer’s intent to resell a unit, 
depriving the buyer of the ability to profit from resale and thereby effectively 
denying the buyer access to the good for resale purposes. Personalized prices 
adjust upward when a buyer intends to use a good for resale, as opposed to 
personal consumption, because a buyer’s willingness to pay for goods that 
the buyer intends to resell must include the amount of the profit that the 
buyer will make from resale. Because firms personalize prices to equal each 
consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for each unit the consumer 
purchases, the personalized price a firm charges to a buyer who intends to 
                                                                                                                     
110 See KREPS, supra note 12, at 306. 
111 See Carroll & Coates, supra note 87, at 474–75. 
112 See id. Under personalized pricing with arbitrage, not only will the firm sell its entire inventory 
at a low price, but all buyers will also buy at that price, so long as resellers compete heavily against each 
other in reselling to high-price buyers. If there are resale costs, however, then price will not be driven all 
the way down to that low price, but only down to a price that includes both that low price and those resale 
costs. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 627 (discussing the cost of resale). Regardless the price paid by 
buyers, under personalized pricing with arbitrage the firm will always earn a price equal to the price it 
charges to low-price consumers, because those low-price consumers will buy up the firm’s entire 
inventory at the low price personalized to them. 
113 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 148. 
114 See POSNER, supra note 21, at 234 n.62 (“recognizing that the prevention of arbitrage . . . could 
be regarded as exclusionary . . . from the standpoint of secondhand dealers”).  
115 See supra text following note 105. 
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resell, in contrast to the personalized price a firm charges to a buyer who 
buys for personal consumption, should be greater by the amount of profit the 
reselling buyer expects to earn from resale of the good. Courts have long 
recognized that charging a price that a buyer cannot afford to pay is 
tantamount to refusing to sell a product to the buyer.116 So personalized 
pricing is its own restraint on competition from resellers, and satisfies both 
the consumer harm and anticompetitive conduct requirements.117 
Personalized pricing is its own restraint on competition, however, only 
so long as the firm personalizes prices accurately. If the firm fails accurately 
to identify the maximum that each consumer is willing to pay, then the prices 
the firm personalizes to resellers will not deprive resellers of all of the profits 
of resale, and may therefore fail to preclude resellers from buying, forcing 
the firm to resort to additional means of denying resellers access to the firm’s 
product. As discussed above, cases of imperfectly-implemented 
personalized pricing can still satisfy the consumer harm requirement for 
monopolization claims.118 In such cases, the additional means employed by 
firms to refuse to sell to resellers constitute the anticompetitive conduct 
required for a monopolization claim.  
There are two main ways in which firms can take additional steps to 
refuse to sell to resellers. The first is simply to refuse outright to sell units to 
consumers whom the firm believes will use the units for arbitrage, instead 
of for personal consumption. Supermarkets do this when they place quantity 
caps on the purchase of discounted goods, forbidding a buyer of discount ice 
cream, for example, from buying more than four pints at the discounted 
price.119 When supermarkets combine these quantity limits with the 
personalization of discount coupons that supermarkets print out for loyalty 
club customers at checkout, the quantity limits prevent arbitrage of what 
amounts to personalized prices for coupon items.120  
The second means firms may employ to prevent purchase for resale is 
                                                                                                                     
116 See, e.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 541 (Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 1986) 
(“Agreeing to deal on unreasonable terms is merely a type of refusal to deal.”). Of course, whether the 
charging of a high price is justified, like the broader question whether a refusal to deal of any form is 
justified, depends on whether the other elements of a monopolization claim are satisfied, including the 
requirement of consumer harm—which takes the cost to the firm of providing access to the buyer into 
account—and whether the general right to refuse to deal applies to save the conduct. See supra text 
accompanying note 45. For the argument that personalized pricing is not justified by costs, see supra text 
accompanying note 75; Section I.A.1; Section I.C. 
117 For the consumer harm associated with personalized pricing, see supra Section I.A.1. 
118 See supra text accompanying note 102. 
119 See Brian Wansink et al., An Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Purchase Quantity Decisions, 
35 J. MARKETING RES. 71, 74 (1998) (arguing that this practice also uses the psychology of anchoring to 
induce consumers to buy up to the quantity limit). 
120 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 11, at 12; Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price 
Discrimination? The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 
41, 52 (2014). 
 
 336 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:2 
to impose resale restrictions either in the grant of title to the product to the 
buyer or as part of a separate contract. Explicit restraints on the resale of 
personal or intellectual property often run afoul of the general judicial 
distaste for restraints on the alienation of property, a distaste that operates 
independently of the antitrust laws.121 For example, in Kirtsaeng v. John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Supreme Court applied the first-sale doctrine in 
copyright law to refuse to enforce a publisher’s restriction on resale of 
textbooks, a restriction that supported the publisher’s efforts to charge higher 
prices to students in rich countries.122 The Court emphasized the 
“importance of leaving buyers of goods free to compete with each other 
when reselling or otherwise disposing of those goods.”123 The policy against 
restraints on alienation probably applies both to restrictions placed in grants 
of title to personal or intellectual property, such as the prohibition at issue in 
Kirtsaeng, and to restrictions imposed in contracts of sale of personal or 
intellectual property.124 The courts similarly condemn restraints on the 
alienation of real property, and in that context also do so regardless whether 
the restraints are contained in the grant or extracted from the buyer in the 
form of a separate contractual promise.125  
But sometimes firms can skirt these rules and prevent resale anyway, as 
the defendant in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., a case which 
will appear again shortly as authority for the treatment of personalized 
                                                                                                                     
121 See Impression Products v. Lexmark Intern., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1531–32 (2017) (referring to “the 
common law principle against restraints on alienation”). 
122 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56, 1363 (2013). The restriction 
placed by the publisher in each of its books read: “Exportation from or importation of this book to another 
region without the Publisher’s authorization is illegal and is a violation of the Publisher’s rights.” Id. at 
1356. 
123 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363; see also Impression Products, 137 S. Ct. at 1529. 
124 For ambiguity on the question whether the policy against restraints on alienability applies to 
void contract-based prohibitions on resale, see Impression Products, 137 S. Ct. at 1533 (“Once sold, the 
Return Program cartridges passed outside of the patent monopoly, and whatever rights Lexmark retained 
are a matter of the contracts with its purchasers, not the patent law.”). For the view, contrary to that taken 
here, that the policy against restraints on alienation does not prevent contract-based prohibitions on 
resale, see Tim Scott, The Availability of Post-Sale Contractual Restrictions in the Wake of Impression 
Products, Inc. v. Lexmark, 581 U.S. 1523 (2017), SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3218569 250 (Social Science 
Research Network), Jul. 23, 2018 (“A sale or purchase of a good can be accompanied by a promise not 
to use that good in a particular way, or only in a particular field or geography. Such a promise would be 
enforceable against the promisor by way of injunction or damages.”). It should be noted that the law is 
considerably more tolerant of restraints on alienation that fall short of prohibiting resale outright, at least 
in the contract context. See Alfred C. Server & William J. Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions 
on Patented Products Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 623–25 (2012–2013); Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (ruling that restrictions on resale price 
are not to be condemned per se).  
125 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 159, 176, 206 (2d ed. 
1983); Procter v. Foxmeyer Drug Co., 884 SW 2d 853, 856, 861–62 (Tex. Court of Appeals, 5th Dist. 
1994) (ruling a contract that restrained alienability of real property void). 
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pricing as monopolization, appears to have done.126 Instead of selling its 
shoemaking machinery to customers outright, and prohibiting resale, United 
Shoe chose instead to lease the machinery to its customers, and to place no-
subletting clauses in the leases. This allowed United Shoe to avail itself of a 
traditional exception to the policy against restraints on alienation, which 
allows restraints on the resale of leasehold interests.127 The fact that the 
government did not challenge the no-subletting clauses in United Shoe on 
restraint-on-alienation grounds suggests that the tactic was successful. 
Courts are far less averse to prohibitions on the resale of services than 
they are to prohibitions on the alienability of property, with the result that 
prohibitions on the resale of services, in the form of contractual prohibitions 
on the assignment of service contracts, are quite common. Courts enforce 
anti-assignment clauses, and although courts may limit the remedy to money 
damages, those damages, in the form of the service provider’s lost profits 
due to resale, are sufficient to render resale of service rights a loss-making 
business.128 The airlines are therefore free, for example, to permit only the 
named ticketholder to fly, thereby preventing ticket buyers from reselling 
the right to fly to others.129 Similarly, hospitals are free to prevent patients 
from assigning their rights to medical services to other patients, and thereby 
to preclude insured patients from reselling, to uninsured patients, the 
                                                                                                                     
126 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 
347 U.S. 521 (1954). For the significance of United Shoe as authority for the treatment of personalized 
pricing as monopolization, see infra Section I.C.1. 
127 Id. at 340–41, 344, 349; HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 386. For the exception for leasehold 
interests, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 125, at 148 (“Forfeiture restraints which give to the 
landlord an option to terminate the tenant’s interest if the tenant alienates without the landlord’s consent 
are widely used in leases.”). 
128 For the enforceability of anti-assignment clauses, and limitation of the remedy to money 
damages, see EDWARD ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 717 (3d ed. 1999). The money damages 
suffered by the firm when a low-price consumer resells the right to the firm’s services to a high-price 
consumer would be the lost profits suffered by the firm as a result of not being able to sell the service 
directly to the high-price consumer at the high price. A court would likely characterize these as 
consequential damages, which are in general recoverable in breach of contract actions. See DOUGLAS 
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 54 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that “the 
trend is certainly to award consequentials more freely”). Given the information requirements associated 
with implementing personalized pricing, the firm would be able to prove the lost profits with the requisite 
level of certainty. Cf. FARNSWORTH, supra, at 718 (stating that “it might not be easy to prove damages 
for the breach [of an anti-assignment clause] with sufficient certainty”). It should be noted that even in 
the absence of an express contractual limit on assignment, courts will refuse to permit assignments that 
would impose a substantial burden on the service provider. See id. at 715. Liberal application of this rule 
would make resale of services impossible regardless whether a firm takes steps to limit assignment, and 
would therefore allow firms to personalize service prices without having to engage in anticompetitive 
conduct and therefore without violating the antitrust laws. But courts have applied this limitation 
sparingly. See id.    
129 Christopher Elliott, Why Can’t Airline Tickets Be Transferable?, USA TODAY (Dec. 23, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2013/12/23/airline-ticket-transfer-name-change/4174145/ 
(“If name changes were allowed, then passengers could resell their tickets anytime, subverting an 
airline’s ability to raise ticket prices as the flight becomes full.”). 
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insureds’ rights to medical services supplied at the low rates negotiated on 
their behalf by insurers. 130 
4. The Refusal to Permit Trade in Purchase Rights as Arbitrage 
Prevention  
Despite its crippling effect on competition between the firm and low-
price buyers who wish to act as resellers, the prevention of arbitrage may not 
be enough to satisfy the anticompetitive conduct requirement of the antitrust 
laws, for not all conduct that actually harms competition satisfies that 
requirement.131 There is an exemption for conduct that improves products.132 
All product improvements harm competition, because consumers prefer 
improved products, and that puts competitors which have failed to innovate 
at a disadvantage.133 Antitrust generally will not, however, treat product-
improving conduct as anticompetitive, because product improvements are 
the main source of welfare increases for consumers in the economy.134 The 
courts fear that the process of balancing the benefits to consumers of product 
improvements against consumer losses from the resulting decline in 
competition and increase in prices is prone to error, and could result in 
mistaken antitrust condemnation of consumer-beneficial conduct.135 So the 
courts simply exempt product-improving conduct, no matter how harmful to 
competition, from the antitrust laws.136 
Many practices that prevent arbitrage simultaneously improve the 
product offered by the firm, which suggests that many instances of arbitrage 
prevention may fall within the exemption for product-improving conduct. 
Clothes-washing machines, for example, are an improvement upon the 
washing board, but washing machines are heavy, driving up transportation 
costs and potentially preventing low-price consumers from reselling 
                                                                                                                     
130 See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 13, 24–
25 (2014) (describing price discrimination by hospitals between the insured and uninsured and observing 
that at one hospital the cost of a joint replacement was $18,000 for an insured patient but $220,000 for 
an uninsured patient). 
131 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 364 (“The problem is that most efficient practices are 
‘exclusionary’ in the sense that they injure rivals or make entry more difficult.”). 
132 See id. at 365 (“[M]ost innovations and expansions by dominant firms that injure rivals are not 
s. 2 violations, even though they do have the effect of expanding or maintaining monopoly power.”). 
133 See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Information Age, 127 YALE 
L.J. 2270, 2309 (2018). 
134 See id. at 2313. 
135 See id. at 2313–14. 
136 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (observing that 
vanquishing competitors through “superior skill, foresight and industry” is no violation of the antitrust 
laws); DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST AN 
EXAMINATION OF US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 28 (2015) (“[M]onopoly is generally tolerated when 
legally acquired on the general rationale of promoting innovation even in specific instances where such 
a prospect is far-fetched.”); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 613–14 (3d ed. 1990). 
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washing machines to high-price consumers.137 The firm that first introduced 
the washing machine to market might plausibly be said to have taken steps 
to prevent arbitrage in the market for clothes-washing tools, but antitrust 
would never treat such conduct as anticompetitive, because washing 
machines are a genuine product improvement relative to washing boards and 
therefore fall within the ambit of the product-improvement exemption.138  
The spread of three-dimensional-printing-driven personalization of 
product design threatens greatly to expand the set of arbitrage-preventing 
practices that fall within the product-improvement exemption.139 Firms can 
now tailor shoes, bite guards, and many other products precisely to fit the 
bodies of their purchasers.140 This tailoring prevents arbitrage, because the 
firm will tailor any additional units that low-price consumers buy for resale 
to the low-price consumers, not to the high-price consumers to whom the 
low-price consumers wish to transfer the units, and the high-price consumers 
will not be willing to buy units that do not fit them. Because design 
personalization makes products better, however, antitrust will not recognize 
as anticompetitive the limits that design personalization places on 
arbitrage.141 
Even arbitrage-prevention techniques that seem at first glance to have 
no bearing on product design can have product-improving effects that bring 
them within the ambit of antitrust’s product-improvement exemption. The 
airlines’ restriction of travel to named ticketholders not only prevents 
arbitrage, for example, but also improves security, by allowing governments 
to keep track of who is flying.142 The restriction of hospital care to named 
purchasers ensures that each patient receives customized care. Indeed, 
virtually all arbitrage-prevention mechanisms have the plausible product-
improvement justification that the mechanisms improve the product by 
allowing the firm to maintain quality control, saving consumers the expense 
of having to inspect goods purchased from low-price consumers who may 
have damaged the goods in the process of handling and storing them for 
                                                                                                                     
137 See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF 
LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 9 (2017) (identifying washing machines as an improvement). 
138 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 296, 300 (discussing the antitrust safe harbor for innovations). 
139 See Nikolaus Franke et al., Testing the Value of Customization: When Do Customers Really 
Prefer Products Tailored to Their Preferences?, 73 J. MARKETING 103, 103 (2009). 
140 See Constance Gustke, Your Next Pair of Shoes Could Come From a 3-D Printer, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/business/smallbusiness/your-next-pair-of-shoes-
could-come-from-a-3-d-printer.html (describing a business that uses cellphone snapshots of feet and 3D 
printers to make custom shoes and whose CEO states: “I saw 3-D printers in a magazine, and I thought 
‘mass customization’”); Gina Kolata, A New Tooth, Made to Order in Under an Hour, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
8, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/a-new-tooth-made-to-order-in-under-an-
hour/ (describing how ten percent of dentists are currently able to use data from small cameras in the 
mouth and a 3D printer to manufacture dental crowns in the office). 
141 See supra note 136. 
142 See Elliott, supra note 129. 
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resale.143   
Despite appearances, the capacity of arbitrage prevention to improve 
products does not ultimately block antitrust from treating arbitrage 
prevention as anticompetitive conduct, because for virtually all forms of 
arbitrage prevention there is a way to decouple any product-improving 
effects from the restriction on arbitrage, allowing firms to permit resale 
while still implementing associated product improvements. The ability to 
decouple improvements from resale restrictions brings arbitrage prevention 
out of the antitrust exemption for product-improving conduct, since the 
exemption applies only if the restriction on competition is necessary to bring 
about the improvement.144  
Firms can decouple product improvements from resale restrictions by 
creating online markets that allow low-price consumers to purchase, at low 
personalized prices, the right to have a product delivered, and then to resell 
that right, instead of purchasing the product itself at low prices and then 
reselling the product itself. Because resale would take place before the firm’s 
products are ever delivered or customized, any costs of redirecting the 
products from one consumer to another subsequent to resale, and any 
barriers to transfer posed by customization, would be avoided. For example, 
the washing-machine maker could permit consumers to purchase and 
transfer title to units that have not yet left the factory floor, allowing low-
price consumers to buy at low personalized prices and resell at high prices 
to high-price consumers who could then take delivery of the units directly 
from the manufacturer, eliminating the cost of trans-shipment between 
reseller and ultimate buyer, as well as any quality-control concerns 
surrounding the handling and storage of resold units.145  
                                                                                                                     
143 See Hillary A. Kremen, Note: Caveat Venditor: International Application of the First Sale 
Doctrine Note, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 161, 167 (1997) (stating that “[q]uality control is a 
concern” for resold goods because resellers “are only concerned with the quick sale and neither customer 
satisfaction nor maintenance”); Scott E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, United States versus United Shoe 
Machinery Corporation: On the Merits, 36 J.L. & ECON. 33, 42–43 (1993) (arguing that leasing practices 
that prevented arbitrage of discriminatory practices were efficient because “[w]hen the prospective 
reliability and other performance attributes of complex, durable goods are difficult to discern at the time 
of purchase, outright sales pose well-known moral hazard problems”). 
144 In other words, the ability to decouple product improvements from resale restrictions means that 
there exists a less restrictive alternative to any method of arbitrage prevention that happens also to 
improve the product. See C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. 
L. REV. 927, 929 (2016). 
145 Of course, the ultimate buyer would be required to pay any incremental cost associated with 
delivering the good to the ultimate buyer as opposed to the original buyer. But those costs will be smaller 
than the costs of delivering the good to the reseller prior to resale to the ultimate buyer. If the costs do 
not fall enough to make resale viable, then there is nothing that the firm can do to facilitate arbitrage of 
its personalized prices, so the firm is not engaged in the prevention of arbitrage, and, in an important 
sense, the resold good is not actually the same good as the one that the firm would sell directly to the 
consumer who would otherwise be the ultimate buyer of the resold good. For more on what constitutes 
two units of the same product, see infra Section I.B.3. 
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Similarly, firms could treat the creation of customized products as a 
service and permit consumers to buy rights to the service, instead of buying 
the customized product itself.146 The low-price consumer could purchase 
rights to the service and then resell those rights to high-price consumers, 
each of whom could then arrange for the product to be tailored and delivered. 
The 3D-printer-enabled shoe manufacturer could, for example, sell the right 
to a pair of customized shoes, as opposed to the customized pair of shoes 
itself, allowing low-price consumers to resell that right to high-price 
consumers, who could then arrange for the shoes to be customized to their 
own feet.147 Indeed, the sale of service rights unlocks the transferability of 
all custom services, not just the service of tailoring physical goods to their 
users. Low-price airline ticket buyers wishing to resell their tickets could, 
for example, purchase rights to have tickets issued in ultimate-ticket-
holders’ names and then resell those rights to high-price buyers.148 High-
price buyers could then use those rights to arrange with the airlines to have 
tickets issued in their names, ensuring that the airlines would continue to 
have accurate information about the identity of each passenger.149  
The low cost of communication and computing power in the information 
age makes the creation of online platforms for the trading of purchase rights 
inexpensive and supremely administrable.150 Of course, a firm that wishes 
to engage in personalized pricing would never want actually to create such 
a platform, because doing so would enable arbitrage. But that is the point. 
The failure of firms to create low-cost systems that facilitate resale is 
anticompetitive conduct: the prevention of arbitrage.151 Moreover, the pure 
refusal of a firm to provide the minimal infrastructure required to allow low-
price consumers to buy and sell purchase rights in the firm’s product can 
never qualify for the product-improvement exemption, because unlike other 
methods of preventing arbitrage, such as the sale of customized products, 
the refusal to make a market in purchase rights contributes nothing to the 
quality of the underlying product.152 The fact that the refusal to make a 
                                                                                                                     
146 Of course, the ultimate buyer would be required to pay any incremental cost of customizing the 
services to the ultimate buyer instead of to the original buyer. See supra note 145.  
147 For customized shoes, see supra note 140. 
148 See Elliott, supra note 129. 
149 See id. 
150 For cost declines in the information age, see Bart van Ark, The Productivity Paradox of the New 
Digital Economy, INT’L PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR, Fall 2016, at 3, 8–9. Indeed, all a firm would need to 
add to its operations in order to sell purchase rights instead of the underlying goods themselves would be 
an interface—which could be implemented with information technology—to allow ultimate purchasers 
to enter delivery or customization information after securing rights from resellers, and perhaps also to 
allow the firm to take payment for any additional costs associated with delivery to a more distant location 
or customization to a more difficult subject. Everything else, from sales to fulfillment, could remain the 
same.    
151 See text accompanying note 114. 
152 For the product improvement exemption, see supra text accompanying note 136. 
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market in purchase rights amounts to an omission, rather than an affirmative 
act, does not make it any less anticompetitive.153 All refusals to deal are 
omissions, because all refusals are omissions to do the thing refused, but 
antitrust has long condemned certain refusals to deal as anticompetitive 
conduct.154  
B. Monopoly Power 
1. Personalized Pricing Is Evidence of Monopoly Power  
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive conduct that 
harms consumers, such as a firm’s refusal to deal with resellers in aid of a 
scheme to personalize prices, only when the firm engaging in that conduct 
has monopoly power.155 Proving monopoly power can be the hardest part of 
a monopolization action, but in the case of personalized pricing it is easy, 
because any firm that is able to personalize prices, even imperfectly, has 
monopoly power as defined by the antitrust laws.156 Antitrust defines 
monopoly power to be the power profitably to raise price above the 
competitive level, with that level usually chosen to be marginal cost.157 
Firms that charge uniform prices often do not meet this definition because 
an increase in a uniform price can render low-willingness-to-pay consumers 
unable to buy.158 The profits lost from no longer being able to sell to those 
consumers can exceed the increased profits generated from the higher prices 
paid by those who do continue to buy, making the price increase unprofitable 
overall.159 But this tradeoff between increased profits from inframarginal 
consumers and lost profits from marginal consumers does not exist when a 
firm uses personalized pricing to raise prices, because personalized pricing 
allows firms to raise prices to high-willingness-to-pay consumers without 
raising prices to low-willingness-to-pay consumers.160 That in turn allows 
firms to extract more profits from those who can pay more, without at the 
                                                                                                                     
153 See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Omission Bias, Individual Differences, and Normality, 94 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 74, 74 (2004). 
154 See generally Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine under U.S. Antitrust Law, 
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443 (2002) (discussing cases in which denial of access to an “essential facility” was 
treated as illegal exclusionary conduct). 
155 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
156 For the difficulty of establishing monopoly power, see Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of 
Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1462 (2009) (stating that “antitrust 
discovery is inevitably costly and protracted. One reason is that . . . . [d]efining the relevant market, by 
itself, is fact-intensive, timeconsuming, costly . . . .”). 
157 See John B. Kirkwood, Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1169, 1173–
74, 1181 (2018). 
158 See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 429–32; John B. Kirkwood, Market Power and Antitrust 
Enforcement 1181 (Seattle Univ. Sch. L., Working Paper, 2017) (“If a firm can price above marginal 
cost, it must have some ability to raise price without losing all its sales . . . .”). 
159 See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 429–32. 
160 See id. at 445–46. For another statement of this point, see supra text accompanying note 67. 
 
 2019] PERSONALIZED PRICING AS MONOPOLIZATION 343 
same time suffering losses from pricing those who are not willing to pay 
more out of the market.161  
Personalized pricing is evidence of monopoly power even for the firm 
that is able only imperfectly to personalize prices.162 Imperfections in 
personalization can manifest in two ways: the personalizing of prices that 
are below a customer’s maximum willingness to pay or the personalization 
of prices that are above a firm’s maximum willingness to pay. If the price is 
too low, the firm fails to extract the maximum possible profit from the 
customer, but it is reasonable to assume that the firm will nevertheless 
extract more profit than if the firm had charged a uniform price equal to 
marginal cost, otherwise the firm would not bother to personalize the price. 
If the price is too high, then the firm will lose the customer’s business, 
leading to a loss that may offset gains from the charging of personalized 
prices to other customers. But it is reasonable to assume that a firm will not 
implement personalized pricing if these losses exceed the gains, because 
then the firm would generate more profit by continuing to charge a uniform 
price equal to marginal cost. It follows that evidence that a firm engages in 
personalized pricing is evidence that the firm is able profitably to raise price 
above marginal cost, regardless whether the firm is able to personalize prices 
to perfection.  
Recognizing that personalized pricing implies monopoly power would 
seem to imply that virtually all firms will have monopoly power, because all 
firms will eventually be able to generate profits through the personalization 
of prices. Virtually all firms sell differentiated products, and any firm that 
sells a differentiated product can increase profits by personalizing higher 
prices to those who prefer the product over the products of competitors.163 It 
would seem to follow that the law will one day need to hold every firm to 
the prohibition on consumer-harmful anticompetitive conduct imposed by 
Section 2 on monopolists.164 Recognizing personalized pricing as proof of 
monopoly power will not open up the litigation floodgates, however, 
because firms will always be able to avoid the monopoly characterization as 
a practical matter simply by refraining from actually engaging in 
personalized pricing. A firm that does not personalize prices generates none 
of the evidence of power profitably to raise prices that a court needs to 
                                                                                                                     
161 See id. Group-based pricing can also enable a firm profitably to raise prices, and for the same 
reasons. But unlike group-based pricing, which is profitable only if the losses associated with pricing 
marginal consumers out of each group do not exceed the gains from charging higher prices to 
inframarginal consumers, personalized pricing is always profitable, relative to uniform pricing, and 
personalized pricing alone is therefore always in itself evidence of a firm’s monopoly power. 
162 For other implications of imperfection in the personalization of prices, see supra text 
accompanying note 102. 
163 See supra text accompanying note 63. For the ubiquity of product differentiation, see Klein & 
Wiley, supra note 84, at 609. Product differentiation is discussed in greater detail in Section I.B.2, infra. 
164 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
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conclude that the firm has monopoly power based on personalized pricing. 
A court might still of course rely on other evidence to conclude that the firm 
has monopoly power, but establishing monopoly power by other means is 
normally difficult to do.165 
In any case, treating personalized pricing as evidence of monopoly 
power is no departure from current antitrust doctrine, because the courts 
have already long treated price discrimination of all kinds as evidence of 
monopoly power.166 The courts must, a fortiori, treat the peculiarly 
profitable form of price discrimination that is personalized pricing as 
evidence of monopoly power.167 Even if the courts choose not to treat 
personalized pricing as direct evidence of monopoly power, enforcers can 
still always prove that a price-personalizing firm has monopoly power by 
using the alternative, indirect, method of proof of monopoly power also 
recognized by the courts.168 Establishing monopoly power by indirect proof 
requires showing that the price-personalizing firm has a market share in 
excess of about seventy-five percent in a properly-defined relevant market. 
A properly-defined relevant market is one in which, if market participants 
were to cartelize and raise price together by more than a certain amount 
above competitive levels, usually five percent, they would increase their 
aggregate profits.169 Market definition generally starts by asking whether the 
firm could profitably raise the price of its own product.170 If not, then the 
firm’s product is considered alongside the closest substitute product sold by 
a competitor, and the question is posed again: could the prices of both 
                                                                                                                     
165 See Stucke, supra note 156, at 1462. 
166 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 158 (stating that “price discrimination is evidence of market 
power”); Jonathan B. Baker, Competitive Price Discrimination: The Exercise of Market Power without 
Anticompetitive Effects (Comment on Klein and Wiley), 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 650 (2003) (“The link 
between price discrimination and market power is well established in antitrust, both in the case law and 
in the writings of . . . a truly impressive list of scholars.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); ANDREW 
I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION 
POLICY 550–51 (3d ed. 2017). 
167 For the profitability of personalized pricing, see supra text accompanying note 50. 
168 For the distinction between direct and indirect proof of monopoly power, see GAVIL ET AL., 
supra note 166, at 544–45. For more on the indirect method of proof, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 
92, 293 (stating that a court “usually . . . determines a relevant . . . market . . . and . . . computes the 
defendant’s percentage of the output in the relevant market thus defined,” and that “[s]everal courts have 
found a market share on the order of 75% to be sufficient . . .” to establish the existence of market power 
(footnotes omitted)) (sources cited therein). 
169 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, §§ 
4.1.1, 4.1.2 (2010) (defining this test and stating that “[t]he Agencies most often use a [price increase] of 
five percent of the price paid by customers for the products or services . . . .”); Malcolm B. Coate & 
Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1031, 1031 (2008) (describing this test as “well established as the test for 
market definition at the United States enforcement agencies, the federal courts, and many international 
antitrust regimes”); HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 112, 357 (stating the test in terms of cartelization and 
indicating that a seventy-five percent market share likely passes the test). 
170 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 111–12. 
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products be increased without reducing the aggregate profits on the two 
products earned by the two firms?171 If yes, then the relevant market includes 
only the two products.172 If no, then a third product is considered alongside 
the first two and the process repeats until a group of products is found for 
which price could profitably be raised.173 Once the market has been defined 
in this way, evidence that the firm’s own product has a high share of the 
market so defined establishes that the firm has monopoly power.174 
Generally, enforcers seek to show monopoly power by this indirect route 
only when the properly-defined relevant market includes more products than 
just the firm’s own product.175 The requirement for defining the relevant 
market to contain just the firm’s own product, that the firm be able profitably 
to raise the price of the firm’s own product, is precisely the requirement for 
establishing monopoly power by direct proof—that the firm be able 
profitably to raise price—and establishing monopoly power by direct proof 
has the advantage over indirect proof that no additional proof of market 
share is required.176 Because personalized pricing always implies the power 
profitably to raise price for the firm’s own product, it follows that the method 
of indirect proof is unnecessary and should be discouraged in personalized 
pricing cases.177 But that does not mean that enforcers cannot define an own-
product relevant market if they choose to do so, and proceed to establish 
monopoly power by indirect proof.178 The additional burden should not be 
too great, because once the own-product market is established as the relevant 
market, high market share follows almost immediately, because the firm that 
personalizes prices must prevent arbitrage, and that in turn ensures that no 
one, not even a reseller, sells the same product as does the firm, implying a 
market share of 100% in the market for the firm’s own product.179  
2. Challenging Antitrust’s Bias in Favor of Interbrand Competition 
Treating personalized pricing as evidence of monopoly power, whether 
as direct evidence or as a basis for defining an own-product relevant market 
under the indirect method of proof, conflicts with a strong tendency in 
antitrust to respect the power of a firm to prevent competitors from selling 
products identical to the firm’s own products, and to attack monopoly power 
                                                                                                                     
171 See id. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. at 109–10. 
175 See id. at 124–30. 
176 For the definition of monopoly power as the power profitably to raise price, see Kirkwood, supra 
note 158, at 1173–74, 1181.  
177 For the argument that personalized pricing always implies the power profitably to raise price for 
the firm’s own product, see supra text accompanying note 156. 
178 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 175 (suggesting that courts rarely, if ever, rely exclusively on 
direct proof of monopoly power). 
179 For the role of arbitrage prevention in personalized pricing, see supra Section I.A.3. 
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only by promoting competition between differentiated products.180 The way 
antitrust normally seeks to prevent harm to consumers arising from the 
charging of higher prices, whether as part of a price discrimination scheme 
or simply the increase of uniform prices, is by stopping firms from erecting 
barriers to competition from other, substitute products.181 Stop firms from 
harming competition between different brands, the thinking goes, and 
consumers will end up with such enviable alternatives to the product offered 
by the price-raising firm that any attempt to raise prices will just cause 
consumers to take their business elsewhere, and so firms will desist from 
personalizing prices or indeed from price increases of any kind.182 
This preference for promoting competition between different products 
offered by different firms—known as interbrand competition—instead of 
promoting competition between identical products offered by a firm and 
resellers of the firm’s own products—known as intrabrand competition—
has nothing to do with economics.183 Both forms of competition are effective 
ways of eliminating the power of a firm profitably to raise prices. Indeed, 
intrabrand competition is probably more effective because interbrand 
competition drives down prices only to the extent that the different brands 
resemble each other, and competition then starts to take on the character of 
intrabrand competition.184 Price competition between Coke and Pepsi will 
be fiercer than price competition between Coke and bottled water, for 
                                                                                                                     
180 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 124 & n. 58 (stating that “most courts refuse to find single 
brand relevant markets”) (sources cited therein).  
181 See United States v. EI du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 392–93 (1956) (“A retail seller may 
have in one sense a monopoly on certain trade because of location, as an isolated country store or filling 
station, or because no one else makes a product of just the quality or attractiveness of his product, as for 
example in cigarettes. Thus one can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every 
nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer having power over the price and production of his 
own product. However, this power that, let us say, automobile or soft-drink manufacturers have over 
their trademarked products is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly. Illegal power must be 
appraised in terms of the competitive market for the product.”). 
182 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 177. 
183 See id. at 602 (distinguishing interbrand restraints from intrabrand restraints). 
184 See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 7 (“[C]ontrol over price is completely eliminated only when 
all producers are producing the identical good and selling it in the identical market.”). The tendency of 
antitrust to ignore the relative superiority of intrabrand competition is illustrated by Herbert 
Hovenkamp’s insistence that price discrimination in competitive markets is good for competition because 
it encourages new firms to enter markets. He writes that “sales . . .to . . . high preference purchasers 
would attract new competitors into at least that part of the market.” HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 386. 
While the increased profits made possible by personalized pricing certainly can attract entry from firms 
offering differentiated, but substitute, products, this entry can never reduce to zero the extra profits 
allowed firms by personalized pricing, because competition cannot eliminate all differences between 
products, as Hovenkamp himself admits. See id. at 623 (“[E]ven tiny airlines in intense competition with 
larger rivals price discriminate in filling their seats.”). So while personalized pricing may be 
procompetitive in interbrand markets in the sense employed by Hovenkamp, it remains anticompetitive—
if supported by measures designed to prevent arbitrage—and harmful to consumers, in intrabrand 
markets. See supra Section I.A.3. 
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example, because Coke and Pepsi are both colas, and this similarity makes 
a consumer of Coke more likely to switch to Pepsi than to water when faced 
with a Coke price increase. Interbrand competition can never drive price all 
the way down to marginal cost because consumers prefer some brand names 
over others, even when consumers are otherwise completely unable to 
distinguish between products, and trademark law prevents firms from selling 
under each others’ brand names.185  
This contrasts rather starkly with intrabrand competition, in which 
multiple sellers have the right to, and do in fact, sell products that are 
identical in all dimensions, including name. Consumers cannot distinguish 
between the goods sold by different sellers in intrabrand competition, and so 
consumers buy based purely on price, leading to competition that in theory 
should drive prices all the way down to marginal cost, a result achievable by 
interbrand competition only in the limit, as competing brands come to lock 
so tightly in competitive embrace that they eventually become identical to 
each other, trademark rules permitting.186 Consumers will always distinguish 
between Coke and Pepsi, because the two products are sold under different 
names, and those who prefer the Coke logo will be willing to pay a premium 
for that symbol. But consumers cannot distinguish between sold-by-Coca-
Cola Coke and resold-by-low-price-buyers Coke on any basis, save perhaps 
the identity of the seller. To the extent that whether a product is offered by 
a reseller is less important to buyers than brand name, the intrabrand price 
competition between Coca-Cola and resellers will be stronger than the 
interbrand competition between Coke and Pepsi. Thus the promotion of 
intrabrand competition is likely a more effective competition policy than the 
promotion of interbrand competition.187  
If the reason antitrust chooses to promote competition in the interbrand 
market instead of in the intrabrand market has nothing to do with economic 
necessity, then what exactly is the cause of antitrust’s preference for 
interbrand competition? The answer is antitrust’s aversion to treating the 
traditional methods firms use to prevent competitors from entering the 
                                                                                                                     
185 See Klein & Wiley, supra note 84, at 609 (“In nearly every real-world competitive market, 
products are differentiated to some degree. Each firm’s product has some unique characteristics that 
distinguish it from the products of competitors. One unique characteristic is the product’s trademark.”). 
The fact that consumers prefer some brand names over others, even when consumers are completely 
unable to distinguish between products, has been proven in the case of Coke and Pepsi. See Samuel M. 
McClure et al., Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference for Culturally Familiar Drinks, 44 NEURON 
379, 384–85 (2004). 
186 See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 271 (“When one producer copies the name, symbol, 
package, or product of another, the result is goods more nearly standardized, and, if the imitator is 
successful, a reduction in the profits of his rival.”). 
187 See id. at 273–74 (observing that intrabrand competition results in lower prices than does 
interbrand competition). 
 
 348 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:2 
intrabrand market as violations of the antitrust laws.188 Firms use property 
and intellectual property law to prevent competitors from selling products 
identical to their own.189 Property law prevents Pepsi executives from 
walking into a Coke bottler, running the machines, and carting off pallets of 
Coke for Pepsi to sell on its own account.190 Patent, copyright, and trade 
secret further prevent Pepsi from reproducing the production methods, 
flavor, and promotional materials used by Coca-Cola in Coke production.191 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, trademark forever prevents 
Pepsi from using and promoting the Coke mark.192 Antitrust is strongly 
opposed to treating the bare exercise of a property or intellectual property 
right as an antitrust violation.193 But in many cases antitrust would be forced 
to do that were antitrust to treat the intrabrand market as the relevant market, 
                                                                                                                     
188 See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 116–23 (2013) 
(discussing the antitrust exemption for “property-based exclusion,” which forestalls intrabrand 
competition by preventing competitors from selling identical products through copying); CHAMBERLIN, 
supra note 63, at 270–73. 
189 Property law prevents competitors from stealing the firm’s production facilities. See infra note 
190. Intellectual property law prevents copying of those facilities, as well as product attributes. See infra 
notes 191, 192; CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 57–64. 
190 Doing so would be trespass. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of 
Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 13 (1985) (“Generally speaking, when the intrusion 
is governed by trespass, then there is no exception for de minimis harms, a rule of strict liability applies, 
and the landholder can obtain an injunction to prevent future invasions.”). For a hypothetical example in 
this spirit, in which competitors are permitted to enter a factory and run the machines whenever the 
factory’s owner seeks to restrict output, see Woodcock, supra note 188, at 165–66. 
191 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 241, 248 (1998) (stating that anything that confers a “competitive advantage when kept 
secret” and is “secret in fact” can be protected under trade secret law); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 323, 434 542 (6th ed. 2012) (observing 
that copyright law prohibits copying of works of literary or artistic expression and patent law prohibits 
use of patented inventions). 
192 See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 272–73 (discussing the role of trademark in preventing 
complete copying of a product). Indeed, producing goods identical to those of a competitor is a violation 
of the common law doctrine of unfair competition, independent of the existence of any trademark 
protecting the brand. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412–13 (1916) (“Courts 
afford redress or relief upon the ground that a party has a valuable interest in the good-will of his trade 
or business, and in the trade-marks adopted to maintain and extend it. The essence of the wrong consists 
in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor for those of another. This essential element is the 
same in trade-mark cases as in cases of unfair competition unaccompanied with trade-mark infringement. 
In fact, the common law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition.” (citation 
omitted)). Unlike a patent or a copyright, a trademark has no formal limit to its duration. See Giovanni 
B. Ramello, What’s in a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic Theory, 20 J. ECON. SURVEYS 547, 555 
(2006) (“[A]lthough the duration of the [trademark] right is theoretically infinite, in practice there exist 
a number of derogations to the property right designed to limit appropriability when the expected social 
costs exceed the benefits[.]”); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (stating that the term of a patent ends 20 years after 
the date of filing); Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the United States, 
http://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm (last updated Feb. 7, 2019) (surveying 
byzantine rules regarding copyright term in the United States). 
193 See Woodcock, supra note 188, at 118–23 (discussing antitrust’s aversion to condemning 
“property-based exclusion”).  
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because promoting competition in an intrabrand market requires that 
competitors be allowed to appropriate or copy the incumbent’s output.194 So 
antitrust does not promote intrabrand competition.  
Three factors make the promotion of competition in intrabrand markets 
appropriate as a response to personalized pricing, notwithstanding antitrust’s 
traditional aversion to interfering with the ability of firms to exercise their 
property rights. First, forcing firms to deal with resellers is not a particularly 
radical intrusion into the property rights of firms because the forced dealing 
would not require firms to sell to consumers with whom they have never 
dealt before. All low-price consumers who engage in resale also buy the 
product for personal consumption, which is what gives these consumers 
access to the product at a low personalized price to begin with.195 The 
remedy for the firm’s refusal to deal with these consumers is, at most, merely 
to require firms to sell additional units to these consumers for resale, which 
amounts to no more than insisting that firms continue a course of dealing 
they have already embraced.196  
The second factor that makes promoting competition in intrabrand 
markets the appropriate choice in personalized pricing cases is that most 
interbrand markets in the U.S. are concentrated, or otherwise uncompetitive, 
but there is little that antitrust can do to promote competition in these 
markets under current law.197 For example, much anticompetitive conduct 
by single firms falls within either the exemption for product-improving 
conduct or an exemption known as the right to refuse to deal, and much 
anticompetitive conduct by groups of firms falls within an exemption for 
tacit collusion.198 Because antitrust cannot do more to promote interbrand 
competition, attacking anticompetitive behavior in intrabrand markets gives 
                                                                                                                     
194 See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 444 (observing that perfect competition requires that competitors 
sell “identical” products). 
195 See supra text accompanying note 113. 
196 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 415–16 (discussing forced sharing as the remedy for a refusal 
to deal). As discussed in Section I.C.4.ii, the far less burdensome remedy of allowing firms to continue 
to decide whether and to whom to sell, and only requiring firms to offer any products they choose to sell 
at non-personalized prices, could be used instead.  
197 See Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/03/26/too-much-of-a-good-thing (using U.S. Economic 
Census data to show that average concentration in U.S. industry rose eight percent between 1997 and 
2012). 
198 Section I.C discusses the right to refuse to deal. Section I.A.4 discusses the exemption for 
product-improving conduct. If the power obtained through product-improving conduct is used to drive 
prices above costs, then the conduct harms consumers. Woodcock, supra note 188, at 126–36 (using an 
economic model to show how the benefits of rewarding the creation of superior products or the 
application of business acumen can fail to outweigh the costs of monopoly power). Tacit collusion 
between firms that is enabled by high market concentration levels does not violate the antitrust laws, 
even though it results in higher prices. See POSNER, supra note 21, at 55 (criticizing the exemption of 
tacit collusion from condemnation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
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antitrust a new way to intervene to help consumers.199  
The third factor that makes promoting competition in intrabrand markets 
the appropriate choice for antitrust in personalized pricing cases is that 
personalized pricing magnifies the harm to consumers inflicted by any given 
level of a firm’s power over interbrand markets, by allowing the firm to 
extract surpluses from consumers that the firm would not be able to reach 
through uniform pricing.200 That is what it means for personalized pricing to 
be able to increase a firm’s profits and harm consumers relative even to 
uniform pricing at monopoly levels.201 If demand is linear and marginal cost 
constant, for example, personalized pricing doubles the amount of surplus 
that a monopoly can extract from consumers.202 As a result, promoting 
intrabrand competition as a remedy for personalized pricing would not 
undermine the balance between firm and consumer interests struck by 
current levels of interbrand competition, but rather would serve only to 
prevent personalized pricing from upsetting that balance in favor of firms.203  
3. Defining the Relevant Product  
Recognizing personalized pricing—or the arbitrage prevention required 
to support personalized pricing—as anticompetitive creates a novel problem 
for antitrust: determining whether any two products are so similar that 
charging different prices for them to different consumers should count as the 
personalized pricing of different units of the same product.204 Treating the 
personalization of prices for different products—charging a higher price to 
a buyer of Sprite and a lower price to a buyer of Coke—as anticompetitive 
                                                                                                                     
199 See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1401–6 (arguing that stricter antitrust rules and enforcement are 
required to counteract the additional harm inflicted by personalized pricing for any given level of market 
power); Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Bargaining Robot, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2017, at 40, 41–42, 
44. 
200 See Woodcock, supra note 199, at 41 (describing this power of personalized pricing to inflict 
greater harm on consumers for any given level of market power as a “second dimension” of power). 
201 See supra Section I.A.1. 
202 Suppose that demand is  	 , where   ,  is the price that just renders quantity demanded 
zero,  is the rate at which price must fall for demand to increase by a single unit,  is the number of 
units demanded, and marginal cost is zero. Then total surplus at the uniform competitive price of zero is 
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, which is half of total surplus at the competitive price, in the form of profit. 
If the monopolist personalizes prices, the monopolist then takes the remaining surplus, doubling the 
amount of surplus taken by the monopolist relative to the amount the monopolist takes under uniform 
pricing. For the characteristic of personalized pricing that it allocates all surplus to the firm, see supra 
text accompanying note 54. 
203 For a related argument, see supra text accompanying note 75. 
204 There appears to be no prior literature defining what constitutes units of the same product for 
purposes of identifying price discrimination. See Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination without 
Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 15–16 (2002) (observing that the definition of the product as the 
set of perfect substitutes is unrealistic, because consumer tastes differ between “production substitutes” 
and concluding that “[e]conomics does not have an unambiguous definition of ‘product’”). 
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would effectively create a duty for any individual firm to charge the same 
price for all of its products. That would wreak havoc across the economy, 
forcing an electronics manufacturer, for example, either to embrace a single 
product line, thereby wasting the economies of scope associated with multi-
product operations, or to sell light switches at the million-dollar-per-unit 
price the firm needs to cover the cost of producing and selling wind 
turbines.205 
What, then, does it mean to charge different prices for different units of 
the same product? What makes one unit the same as another? The answer 
cannot be that two units are identical only when they are identical in physical 
form. Not only are no two goods absolutely alike—each will have small 
differences, perhaps at the microscopic level—but no two goods, even if 
physically identical, can exist in the same place at the same time. And yet a 
good here now is meaningfully different, for most consumers, than a good 
there later, suggesting that time and location are product attributes, and 
therefore that no two units of a good can really be the same.206 To avoid the 
implication of this line of reasoning, which is that personalized pricing is 
impossible because no two goods are really the same, some rule is required 
to allow antitrust to treat groups of admittedly individually unique products 
offered by the same firm as the same product.207 What is required, to draw 
an analogy to the market definition process associated with indirect proof of 
monopoly power, is the definition of the relevant product.208  
Antitrust should define the relevant product to include all units of 
production for which, if the firm were to personalize prices, arbitrage would 
be possible. That is, any unit that a high-price buyer would be willing to buy 
from a reseller in lieu of the unit the firm wishes to sell to the buyer at a 
personalized high price should count as the same product as the product the 
firm wishes to sell to the high-price buyer. Letting the possibility of arbitrage 
define what counts as the same product amounts to letting consumers—or 
guesses about what consumers would do—decide which goods count as the 
                                                                                                                     
205 See ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 
24 (1994) (discussing economies of scope); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 11, at 7 (observing that differences in prices result from 
differences in costs). 
206 I am grateful to Russell D. Covey for suggesting this argument to me. See CHAMBERLIN, supra 
note 63, at 56 (observing that product differentiation exists if “any significant basis exists for 
distinguishing the goods” and “[i]t may also exist with respect to the conditions surrounding [the good’s] 
sale[,]” including “the convenience of the seller’s location”). The value of location to consumers is 
reflected in the importance of location to the definition of interbrand markets. See HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 1, at 124 (“The relevant geographic market for antitrust purposes is some geographic area in which 
a firm can increase its price without 1) large numbers of its customers quickly turning to alternative 
supply sources outside the area or 2) producers outside the area quickly flooding the area with substitute 
products.”). 
207 See Levine, supra note 204, at 15–16. 
208 See id. 
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same and which do not. Under this test, if consumers would not treat a pair 
of goods as so alike that they would be willing to substitute a resold unit for 
the original, then the pair of goods are different and personalized pricing 
between them would be irrelevant for antitrust purposes. Here products that 
may look different or exist in different places and at different times count as 
the same if resellers are capable of overcoming these differences to make a 
market in them.  
Determining whether resale is possible between a set of products is of 
course a counterfactual undertaking, particularly in the context of an 
antitrust challenge to personalized pricing predicated upon the claim that the 
firm has taken steps to prevent resale, which would imply that consumers 
have not in fact had a full opportunity to buy resold units.209 But proving 
counterfactuals is nothing new in antitrust.210 To challenge any practice as 
anticompetitive under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is necessary to show 
that the practice harms competition, and that in turn must rest on the claim 
that in the absence of the practice competition would be stronger.211 Showing 
that resale would have been possible between units of a product but for 
restrictions placed by a firm on arbitrage amounts to doing no more than 
that. 
Whether resale would be possible, and therefore whether a group of 
products count as the same product for antitrust purposes, depends on how 
costly resale would be for resellers were the firm to do nothing to restrict 
resale.212 That is, the counterfactual question whether resale is possible 
between a set of products must be answered under the assumption that the 
firm is taking no steps to prevent resale. Making that assumption in turn 
requires a determination regarding what practices should count as restrictive 
and what practices should count as benign, even if they may incidentally 
raise the cost of resale. That determination has already been made in the 
determination of what practices count as anticompetitive arbitrage 
prevention under the Sherman Act.213 The answer is that a firm’s adjustment 
of prices to extract resale profits from consumers who engage in resale, and 
additional refusal to allow consumers to buy and trade the right to purchase 
the product at the price personalized by the firm to the consumer, counts as 
                                                                                                                     
209 See supra Section I.A.3. 
210 See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic 
Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 4 (2010) (describing market 
definition as difficult and error prone because it requires “the analyst to predict price changes by a 
counterfactual firm”). 
211 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58–59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing the 
requirement of harm to competition). 
212 See supra text accompanying note 137. 
213 See supra Section I.A.4. 
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the restriction of arbitrage.214 For the charging of prices that do not account 
for resale profits is required to ensure that resellers are able to buy low and 
sell high, and rights trading is required to decouple resale from trans-
shipment, product customization, and other problems that might in many 
cases make resale impossible even if the firm were not to charge prices to 
resellers that would eliminate resellers’ profits from resale.215 It follows that 
if a low-price consumer would be willing to resell a right to purchase a 
product from a firm at a price personalized by the firm to the low-price 
consumer without regard to the profits the low-price consumer might earn 
from reselling the product, and a high-price consumer would be willing to 
purchase that resold right in lieu of buying another product directly from the 
firm at a high personalized price, then the two products should count as the 
same product and the personalization of their prices should count as the 
personalized pricing of units of the same product. 
Defining the relevant product in terms of the possibility of resale ensures 
that products will be treated as the same for personalized pricing purposes 
only if any production cost differences are not so large as to explain entirely 
the difference in prices between the two products.216 Thus the question 
whether a Coke offered for $2 in Missouri and another offered for $3 in 
California is the same product for purposes of personalized pricing would 
depend upon whether the California buyer would be willing to buy the right 
to the Missouri Coke—and pay any shipping surcharge associated with 
delivery of that Coke to California instead of Missouri—were the Missouri 
buyer to offer that right for a price below $3.217 By the same token, defining 
the relevant product in terms of the possibility of resale also ensures that 
products are not treated as identical simply in virtue of having identical 
production costs. It may cost Coca-Cola the same amount to produce and 
deliver a Sprite or a Coke to a particular consumer, but the two products 
should be treated as the same only if consumers themselves would treat them 
as substitutes in the resale market.218   
                                                                                                                     
214 For the adjustment of prices to extract resale profits as a form of arbitrage prevention, see supra 
text accompanying note 115. For the refusal to allow resellers to trade purchase rights as a form of 
arbitrage prevention, see supra text accompanying note 151. 
215 See supra text accompanying notes 115, 151. 
216 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 11, at 7. 
217 See supra note 145. 
218 Of course, when different products have the same production costs, the charging of personalized 
prices for the two products inflicts the same kind of consumer harm that the personalized pricing of one 
particular product inflicts. Charging a high-willingness-to-pay buyer of Sprite a high price and a low 
willingness to pay buyer of Coke a low price extracts the exact same amount of consumer surplus as 
would charging a high price to one buyer of Coke and a low price to another, assuming that Sprite and 
Coke have the same production costs with respect to all of these buyers. But there can be no claim of 
anticompetitive prevention of arbitrage in the case of personalized pricing across products so long as 
consumers do not view the products as substitutes. If the high-willingness-to-pay buyer of Sprite will not 
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C. The Right to Refuse to Deal Does Not Apply 
Establishing that the prevention of arbitrage is anticompetitive and 
harmful to consumers, that the product-improvement exemption does not 
apply, and that price-personalizing firms have monopoly power, is not 
enough to make a monopolization claim, because when a firm prevents a 
low-price consumer from buying for resale, the firm engages in a refusal to 
deal, and most refusals to deal fall within a broad antitrust exemption that 
the Supreme Court calls the “long recognized right of trader or manufacturer 
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own 
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.”219 This “right 
to refuse to deal” does not, however, apply to the prevention of arbitrage in 
aid of personalized pricing.220 
1. United Shoe 
The courts have never squarely addressed the question whether a refusal 
to deal with an arbitrager is protected by the right to refuse to deal, but 
United Shoe comes close.221 In United Shoe, clauses in the shoe machinery 
maker’s leases prevented low-rental-price lessees from subletting shoe-
making machinery to high-rental-price lessees, and thereby allowed United 
                                                                                                                     
buy Coke at any price, then Coca-Cola does not need to engage in prevention of arbitrage to support its 
personalizing of prices to the Sprite and Coke buyers, and therefore no monopolization claim can be 
brought against Coca-Cola. The inability of the proposed definition of the relevant product to reach this 
case represents no great loss to consumers, however, because a firm that personalizes prices across 
products likely also personalizes prices within products, exposing the firm to monopolization liability for 
the within-product personalization of prices. If Coca-Cola personalizes higher prices to high-willingness-
to-pay buyers of Sprite than to low-willingness-to-pay buyers of Coke, Coca-Cola likely also 
personalizes lower prices to low-willingness-to-pay buyers of Sprite than to high-willingness-to-pay 
buyers of Sprite, and higher prices to high-willingness-to-pay buyers of Coke than to low-willingness-
to-pay buyers of Coke, exposing the company to separate liability for personalized pricing of both 
products. 
219 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Pitofsky et al., supra note 154, 
at 446 (discussing the “the general rule that a firm has no obligation to deal with its competitors”); GAVIL 
ET AL., supra note 22, at 706 (“For the most part, courts have declined to require monopolists to cooperate 
with another business entity.”). The legal concept of “refusal to deal” extends beyond outright refusals 
to sell and includes the placing of any sort of restriction on access by a potential competitor to an input 
owned by the firm. See IIIB HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 299–300 n.55 (4th ed. 2015) 
(listing cases in which restrictions that fell short of outright refusal to deal were treated as covered by the 
right to refuse to deal). For example, charging a very high price counts as a refusal to deal. See 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 328 (treating the charging of a high price as a refusal to deal). For the 
anticompetitive character of arbitrage prevention, see supra Section I.A.3. For the consumer-harmful 
character of arbitrage prevention, see supra Section I.A.1. For the monopoly power of firms that prevent 
arbitrage, see Section I.B. For arbitrage prevention as refusal to deal, see supra text accompanying note 
114. 
220 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 321–22 (discussing the existence of an exception to the right 
to refuse to deal). 
221 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 340 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per 
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). For more on the case, see supra Section I.A.3. 
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Shoe to earn “a higher rate of return where competition is of minor 
significance, and a lower rate of return where competition is of major 
significance.”222 The court responded by ordering non-discriminatory 
pricing of the leases, a remedy that denies a firm’s right to refuse to deal, at 
least to a small extent, by regulating the terms of any dealing undertaken by 
the firm.223 More significantly, the court also ordered United Shoe to offer 
shoemaking machinery not just for lease but also for sale, because, “[i]nsofar 
as United’s machines are sold rather than leased, they will ultimately, in 
many cases, reach a second-hand market. From that market, United will face 
a type of substitute competition which will gradually weaken the prohibited 
market power which it now exercises.”224 Thus the court forced United Shoe 
to deal in the sale of shoe-making machines for the express purpose of 
promoting resale competition.225 While the court’s remedy was clearly 
aimed at resale, the court professed to hold United Shoe liable not for 
preventing arbitrage in aid of its price discrimination scheme, but for using 
price discrimination—specifically the cutting of prices in competitive 
markets—to discourage competitors from selling competing brands of 
shoemaking machinery.226 Thus liability was based on harm to competition 
in interbrand markets, rather than harm to competition from resellers seeking 
to arbitrage United Shoe’s discriminatory prices in intrabrand markets.227 
Courts have broad authority to create remedies for violations of the antitrust 
laws that do more than just reverse the conduct that gives rise to liability.228 
The fact that the court in United Shoe ordered dealing to promote resale does 
not therefore guarantee that courts would set aside the right of a seller to 
refuse to deal in considering whether the prevention of arbitrage should give 
rise to liability for monopolization. United Shoe is therefore not entirely 
                                                                                                                     
222 See id. at 315, 340–41; HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 316 (stating that United Shoe’s “leasing 
may have facilitated price discrimination by preventing arbitrage”); POSNER, supra note 21, at 234 
(observing that “[b]y leasing instead of selling, the monopolist can prevent a secondhand market from 
developing”); Michael Waldman, Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative 
Explanation for Leasing, 40 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66 (1997) (recounting the argument of Victor Goldberg in 
an unpublished manuscript as follows: “In a sales market, price discrimination is difficult because of the 
possibility of arbitrage, that is, customers offered a low price can purchase and resell to those customers 
the monopolist is trying to charge a high price. By using the lease-only option United eliminated arbitrage 
opportunities and then achieved price discrimination through the classic scheme sometimes referred to 
as metered sales”); John Shepard Wiley Jr et al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 717–
18 (1990) (making the argument that the leases were in aid of price discrimination). 
223 United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 340–41, 349. It should be noted that the remedy does largely respect 
the right to refuse to deal, by preserving the discretion of the firm to choose not to sell to any particular 
buyer at any price. For more on a non-discrimination order as a light-touch alternative to ordering dealing, 
see infra Section I.C.4.ii.  
224 Id. at 350. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. at 344–45. 
227 See id. 
228 See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 166, at 1379. 
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apposite as authority for the proposition that the right to refuse to deal does 
not block liability for arbitrage prevention.229 Nonetheless, it remains true 
that in United Shoe the court ordered a firm to deal for the express purpose 
of promoting resale. 
2. Prior Dealings and Other Considerations 
Absent any case directly on point, the question whether the prevention 
of arbitrage is covered by the right to refuse to deal can be decided only by 
application of general antitrust rules governing refusals to deal.230 These 
rules strongly suggest that the prevention of arbitrage is not protected by the 
right to refuse to deal. Two Supreme Court cases, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp.231 and Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko,232 serve as the basis for the rules.233 In Aspen Skiing, an 
owner of three ski mountains worked with the owner of a fourth mountain 
to sell a combined pass that allowed skiers access to all four mountains.234 
The owner of the three mountains, Ski, pulled out of the combined pass and 
refused to sell passes to its mountains to the owner of the fourth mountain, 
Highlands, even at retail prices, preventing Highlands from reconstructing 
the combined pass on its own. Highlands challenged the refusal as 
monopolization and the Court affirmed a jury verdict in Highland’s favor.235 
In Trinko, by contrast, Verizon refused to provide high-quality access to the 
company’s telephone network to competing telephone service providers 
who wanted to use Verizon’s telephone network to connect calls, but the 
Court in that case ruled that the refusal to deal did not violate the antitrust 
laws.236 The Court appeared ultimately to decide the case on the ground that 
because telecom regulators had concurrent authority to compel Verizon to 
deal with competitors, antitrust intervention would be inappropriate.237 But 
the Court also distinguished the case from Aspen Skiing on a number of 
antitrust grounds to which courts look today in deciding the scope of any 
antitrust duty to deal with competitors.238  
                                                                                                                     
229 See United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344–45.  
230 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 324–31 (discussing recent lines of refusal to deal cases 
involving aftermarket repair parts and price or supply squeezes). 
231 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
232 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
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235 See id. at 589–91, 593, 600, 610–11. 
236 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402–04, 416. 
237 See id. at 411–15. 
238 See id. at 404–05, 408–11, 413, 415–16. For a discussion of recent lower court cases applying 
Trinko, see Mark S. Popofsky & Ariel A. Martinez, Section 2 and the Rule of Reason: Report from the 
Front, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2016, at 2–3, 
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The Court in Trinko suggested that for a refusal to deal to be illicit, the 
refusal must be motivated by “dreams of monopoly,” which in turn the Court 
suggested can be established unambiguously only when the refusal to deal 
represents the termination of a prior profitable course of dealing. A firm does 
not terminate a profitable course of dealing, the Court reasoned, unless the 
firm hopes to substitute even higher, presumably monopoly-based, profits in 
the future for the profits lost through the termination of the prior dealing.239 
Thus the Court held Ski liable in Aspen Skiing because Ski and Highlands 
had made money off of the combined pass for years, and Ski’s refusal to 
continue participating in the combined pass therefore suggested malevolent 
intent.240 Indeed, the Court emphasized in Trinko that Ski’s refusal in Aspen 
Skiing to sell tickets to Highland for resale as part of the combined pass, 
even at the same retail prices at which Ski sold tickets to consumers—prices 
which were presumably high enough for Ski to cover costs—was 
particularly damning evidence of a monopolizing purpose.241 By contrast, 
the Court in Trinko observed that Verizon had never provided competitors 
access to its network, had tried to provide access only when Congress 
compelled the firm to do so, and might well have ended up making a loss on 
those compelled dealings with competitors because the prices Verizon could 
charge were fixed by regulators.242 Of course, Verizon’s refusal to deal 
might still have been motivated by dreams of monopoly, but it could also 
have just represented good business sense, and for that reason the Court 
seemed reluctant to condemn the company’s conduct.243 
Arbitrage prevention easily meets the prior profitable course of dealing 
test suggested by the Court in Trinko. There must always be a prior course 
of dealing in prevention of arbitrage cases because the price-personalizing 
firm must permit low-price consumers initially to buy for personal use. If 
the firm is not willing initially to sell to low-price consumers for personal 
use, then the firm cannot personalize prices and will end up selling only at a 
single high price to high-price consumers. The price-personalizing firm must 
therefore be willing to sell to low-price consumers at low prices, and to cut 
low-price consumers off only when they wish to go beyond what they need 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Section-2-and-the-Rule-
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239 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. A number of courts have followed this suggestion. See, e.g., In re 
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for themselves to buy additional units for resale to high-price consumers. 
But that cutting-off of low-price consumers once they start to buy for resale 
represents the termination of a prior course of dealing with those low-price 
consumers.244 
The prior course of dealing between the firm and low-price consumers 
must have been profitable because a price-personalizing firm will not 
normally sell initial units to low-price consumers at prices that are below 
cost and therefore unprofitable.245 Quite to the contrary, in any personalized-
pricing scheme, the firm charges all buyers prices that are above cost in the 
economic sense.246  Roughly, the firm charges high-price consumers a price 
substantially above cost and low-price consumers a price that is only very 
slightly above cost, indeed, only just high enough to ensure that it is worth 
the firm’s while to sell units to low-price consumers instead of directing the 
resources used to produce the units toward their next-most-lucrative uses for 
the firm.247 The firm does not make below-cost sales because below-cost 
sales reduce the firm’s total profit.248 In other words, all personalized pricing 
is retail pricing in the sense of pricing high enough to make selling 
worthwhile to the firm. When the price-personalizing firm sells initial units 
to low-price consumers who are still buying for themselves and who have 
not yet started to buy for resale, the firm engages in a profitable dealing with 
consumers whom the firm later cuts off when the firm refuses to sell 
additional units to them for resale. 
Herbert Hovenkamp has suggested that Trinko also restricts 
condemnation of refusals to deal only to refusals to deal in goods that the 
firm could produce with existing production capacity, as opposed to refusals 
to deal in goods that the firm would be able to produce only by expanding 
production capacity.249 Aspen Skiing and Trinko can indeed be distinguished 
                                                                                                                     
244 It might be argued in the arbitrage context that the prior dealing required should be in units 
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based on this capacity rule. Offering the combined pass would not have 
forced Ski to acquire new slopes because Ski appears always to have had 
enough room on its slopes to accommodate all skiers using that pass.250 By 
contrast, Verizon needed to modify its network in order to provide access to 
competitors.251 
The prevention of arbitrage satisfies any excess capacity rule. Units that 
low-price consumers buy for resale always come from the firm’s existing 
capacity because any units that high-price consumers buy from resellers are 
units that those high-price consumers do not buy from the firm. As a result, 
the firm’s total output remains the same when there is arbitrage as when 
there is no arbitrage.252 When the firm must deal with resellers, the firm 
suffers a decline in demand from high-price consumers, because those 
consumers buy from resellers instead, and an exactly-offsetting increase in 
demand from resellers, through whom the high-price consumers now make 
their purchases. 
The Court in Trinko also touched upon the longstanding rule that for any 
refusal to deal to be actionable under the antitrust laws, the market must be 
unable independently to produce what the defendant is refusing to supply.253 
The good must, in other words, be essential to competition in the market.254 
Otherwise, competitors are not really excluded by a denial of access to the 
good.255 This requirement was satisfied in both Aspen Skiing and Trinko, and 
so did not contribute to the different outcomes of the cases. In Aspen Skiing, 
regulatory obstacles prevented both Highlands and any third party from 
opening additional slopes to replace those owned by Ski.256 In Trinko, 
competing telephone service providers would have found it very difficult to 
build their own competing landline telephone networks.257 Indeed, that 
difficulty had led Congress to order Verizon to provide competing telephone 
service providers with access.258 
The essentiality requirement is trivially satisfied in the case of arbitrage 
                                                                                                                     
250 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 589–93 (1985) 
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prevention, because the only way to sell to consumers who are committed to 
buying a firm’s product at personalized prices is to resell the firm’s own 
product to them at lower prices. Those consumers will not accept other 
firms’ products as substitutes. The reason is that the maximum price that a 
consumer is willing to pay for a product is the highest price the consumer is 
willing to pay without giving up on purchasing the product and buying a 
substitute product sold by a competing firm instead.259 When a firm 
personalizes prices to equal a consumer’s maximum willingness to pay, or 
tries but fails and ends up charging a price below the consumer’s maximum 
willingness to pay, the firm’s product faces no competition from other firms’ 
products with respect to that consumer, because the prices the firm charges 
are, by design, low enough to ensure that the consumer prefers to purchase 
the firm’s product.260 It follows that the only way for anyone, including a 
reseller, to compete for that consumer is to offer the same product to the 
consumer at a lower price than the firm is charging.261 When the firm refuses 
to sell units of its product to low-price consumers for resale, the firm is 
therefore refusing to deal in an input that is essential for anyone to compete 
for the firm’s consumers, given the personalized prices that the firm is 
charging to those consumers. 
3. The Irrelevance of Reliance  
Herbert Hovenkamp has also suggested that under Trinko a refusal to 
deal can be condemned only if the target of the refusal made a substantial 
investment in reliance on the expectation that the firm would continue a prior 
course of dealing.262 The existence of a reliance interest does indeed 
distinguish Aspen Skiing from Trinko.263 In Aspen Skiing, Highlands 
                                                                                                                     
259 See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 4 (describing the consumer’s reservation price as the highest at 
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 2019] PERSONALIZED PRICING AS MONOPOLIZATION 361 
appeared unable to compete with Ski in the absence of the combined pass.264 
Thus any investment Highlands made in developing and operating its 
mountain during the decades when the firms offered the combined pass was 
made by Highlands in reliance on the continued existence of the pass.265 By 
contrast, in Trinko, there was no suggestion that competitors had ever 
expected to have access to Verizon’s network before Congress compelled 
access.266 So competitors likely had not made substantial investments in 
reliance upon having access.267  
If Trinko does impose a reliance requirement, then the promotion of 
arbitrage would not always be illicit. Only low-price consumers who invest 
in resale in reliance on their ability to buy initial units for personal 
consumption would be able to challenge the firm’s refusal to sell units for 
resale. But the weakness of the case for a reliance requirement suggests that 
arbitrage prevention claims will not face this obstacle. Indeed, there are three 
good reasons not to read Trinko as creating a reliance requirement. The first 
is that the Trinko opinion makes no explicit reference to such a requirement 
and the lower courts have not read the opinion to impose one.268 The second 
is that the concept of reliance plays no role anywhere else in antitrust 
policy.269 And the third, and most important, reason is that the only value of 
reliance as a criterion for distinguishing between licit and illicit refusals to 
deal lies in reliance’s utility as a proxy for the existence of a prior profitable 
course of dealing, because firms tend to make investments in reliance on 
prior dealings. But absent a prior profitable course of dealing, reliance has 
no independent power to reveal “dreams of monopoly.” A firm may cancel 
planned dealings with competitors upon which the competitors have relied 
because the firm has concluded that the dealings would not be profitable at 
all, rather than because the firm has concluded that the firm can earn 
monopoly profits from the cancellation.270 By contrast, absent a change in 
market conditions, a firm that terminates a prior profitable course of dealing 
cannot have done so out of concern that continuing the dealing would be 
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unprofitable, suggesting that the termination must lead to the even greater 
profits associated with monopoly.271  
4. Remediability 
i. Forcing Resale Leads Neither to Collusion nor Price 
Administration 
The Court in Trinko also suggested that a major reason for judicial 
reluctance to condemn refusals to deal is concern that the natural remedy, 
which is to compel dealing, either facilitates collusion between the parties 
to the case or puts the courts in the unacceptable position of having to dictate 
prices and other terms of dealing.272 Remedies for the prevention of arbitrage 
do not, however, put the courts in either position.273  
The natural remedy for an illicit refusal to deal is indeed for the court to 
order the firm to deal.274 In the context of the prevention of arbitrage, that 
means ordering the firm to sell units to low-price consumers for resale.275 To 
prevent the firm from discouraging resale by raising prices to extract some 
of the low-price consumer’s gains from resale, the court must order the firm 
to charge the low-price consumer the same price on units the consumer 
wishes to resell as the lowest price the firm charges the consumer for units 
that the consumer uses for personal consumption.276 To prevent the firm 
from relying upon product characteristics such as customization or status as 
a service to prevent resale, the court must also require the firm to provide 
consumers with a platform for trading in rights to purchase the firm’s 
products at the lowest prices personalized to the reseller.277 
Forcing dealing in this way does not, however, implicate the concerns 
expressed by the Court in Trinko regarding the remedy of forced dealing.278 
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One concern raised by the Court is that enforced dealing could create an 
environment of cooperation between competitors that might end with 
collusion and the fixing of higher prices to consumers.279 Forcing Ski to 
work with Highlands to create a four-mountain pass could, for example, lead 
the two slope operators to collude in ways that harm consumers, by agreeing 
not to engage in a competitive race to invest in expensive upgrades to 
facilities.280 This concern does not arise in the arbitrage prevention context, 
however, because it is consumers themselves who are the competitors in this 
context.281 Ordering the price-personalizing firm to deal with competitors in 
this context would amount only to requiring the firm to sell to its own 
customers, as opposed to requiring the firm to enter into dealings with firms 
selling different, but competing, products. There is therefore no danger that 
forced dealing would require a firm to interact with other firms competing 
in the same interbrand market, much less lead to cartelization of an 
industry.282 The worst that could result from forced dealing in this context 
would be that the firm might be able to continue personalizing prices by 
using profits from sales to high-price consumers to bribe some low-price 
consumers not to engage in arbitrage.283 But even then the remedy would 
still temper the effects of personalized pricing, because the bribe would 
return some of the surplus extracted from consumers via personalized 
pricing back to consumers.  
A second concern about forced dealing expressed by the Court in Trinko 
is that forced dealing requires courts to engage in price administration.284 
The Court famously observed that compelling dealing requires courts to “act 
as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms 
of” sale.285 The different outcomes in Aspen Skiing and Trinko may be 
attributed in part to this concern. In Aspen Skiing, forced dealing meant 
requiring Ski to reinstitute a product that had existed in the past, giving the 
Court some baseline to use in supervising cooperation between Ski and 
Highlands going forward.286 By contrast, in Trinko, in which the Court 
ultimately refused to find liability, the absence of a prior record of dealing 
between Verizon and its competitors would have required the Court to set 
network access prices without having terms of prior dealing to use as a 
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guide.287 Courts would not need to engage in price administration in order to 
force firms to permit resale in the personalized pricing context. Just as in 
Aspen Skiing, in the case of personalized pricing there always is a prior 
course of dealing—namely, the sales made by the firm to low-price 
consumers for personal consumption—that the courts can use as a baseline 
in setting the prices at which firms are required to offer purchase rights to 
low-price consumers.288  
ii. Compelling Impersonal Pricing Would Be Even Less 
Burdensome  
Although forced sharing neither creates the harms normally to be feared 
from collusion nor leads to the judicial price-setting normally to be feared 
from judicially-compelled dealing, and as a result gives no grounds to the 
courts for exempting arbitrage prevention from condemnation as 
monopolization, forced dealing is not the remedy that least implicates 
concerns regarding collusion or price administration.289 That honor falls 
instead to the remedy of ordering the firm to stop charging personalized 
prices and to start charging impersonal prices, whether uniform or group 
based, instead. Rather than compelling firms to sell units to low-price 
consumers for resale at the same personalized prices at which the firms sell 
to low-price consumers for personal consumption, which is what the forced 
sharing remedy does, the courts could instead simply order firms not to 
personalize prices, while still leaving it to firms to continue to exercise 
complete discretion over whether to sell, to whom, and what (impersonal) 
prices to charge.  
An order that a firm not personalize prices can lead neither to collusion 
nor price administration.290 Impersonal pricing cannot promote collusion of 
any degree or kind, because unlike forced sharing an order not to personalize 
prices does not require that the firm cooperate with resellers at all. An order 
not to personalize prices simply constrains the manner in which the firm can 
structure its prices. That is an improvement over forced resale, which, as 
noted above, could facilitate collusion between the firm and resellers that 
might preserve some personalized pricing, even if forced resale would not 
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lead to interbrand collusion.291 An order that a firm not personalize prices 
would also avoid judicial price administration to a greater extent than would 
forced resale.292 Courts issuing an order not to personalize prices would not 
need to require the firm to deal and therefore would not need to set price, 
quantity, or other terms, even by reference to past terms.293 The firm could 
instead continue to set all the terms of sale, including price, subject only to 
the condition that the firm not personalize the price the firm charges for each 
unit that the firm sells.  
Courts feel much more comfortable prohibiting discrimination than they 
feel forcing dealing, which suggests that courts would feel more comfortable 
enforcing orders prohibiting the discrimination in prices based on individual 
willingness to pay that is personalized pricing than they would feel forcing 
firms to sell to resellers. Indeed, the comfort of the courts with prohibitions 
on discrimination runs very deep. Formal equality is a fundamental principle 
of the legal system, embodied in the rule of stare decisis that requires that 
courts themselves not discriminate based on irrelevant characteristics.294 
Like cases must be treated alike.295 Every time a court concludes that a 
particular case is governed by precedent, the court decides that the defendant 
in the case is similarly situated to the defendant in the precedential case and 
must therefore be treated by the court in the same way as the court treated 
the defendant in the precedential case.296 Courts also insist that like be 
treated alike in business conducted outside of the court system whenever the 
courts apply the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, or some other anti-discrimination statute.297 Under these rules, 
courts insist, for example, that like job applicants be treated alike by 
employers.298 The courts, in other words, know how to police discrimination, 
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and do it all the time. Extending their powers to prohibit a particular kind of 
discrimination in pricing should be easy. 
Indeed, policing discrimination in pricing should be no harder for the 
courts to carry out than policing discrimination in all the other areas in which 
the courts police discrimination today. In both price and non-price 
discrimination cases, the key problem is defining similarity.299 In the case of 
employment discrimination in hiring, for example, the key issue is whether 
two job candidates are similarly qualified for the position, but were treated 
differently.300 That in turn requires courts to make difficult decisions about 
what constitutes qualification for a job.301 In the case of pricing, the 
existence of discrimination turns on the question whether the products for 
which the firm personalizes prices are the same in the sense that resellers 
would be able profitably to arbitrage the price differences if the firm were to 
make a market in the resale of price rights.302 To be sure, that is a complex 
question, but it is not clear that the question is more complex than the 
question whether one employee would perform better than another at work. 
If courts can handle discrimination cases involving complex social questions 
like equal treatment in employment then they can handle the question 
whether a firm is personalizing prices. 
Enforcing non-personalization in pricing is not only no harder than 
enforcing non-discrimination in other areas, but also easier than the 
alternative remedy of enforcing dealing. Recall that firms can prevent 
arbitrage in two ways: by personalizing prices that extract any profits that a 
low-price consumer can earn from arbitrage and by refusing to create an 
online platform that would allow consumers to trade their rights to their 
personalized prices.303 As a remedy for price-based arbitrage prevention, a 
non-personalization order is less expensive to enforce than an order 
compelling sale at low personalized prices because a non-personalization 
order requires only that courts review prices for personalization, whereas a 
compelled sale order requires both review of prices (to ensure that they are 
the same low prices charged for personal consumption) and review of the 
                                                                                                                     
shifts in the organization of employers’ firms, as ‘market productive’ as others who receive the benefits, 
such as jobs, promotions, or pay, that members of the protected group seek.”). 
299 See Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 859 (2002) (lamenting the “similarly situated” requirement 
because “[a]ny court could find, however, that because of one thing or another an employee is not 
similarly situated to another employee”). 
300 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (requiring a showing that 
plaintiff was qualified for the job in order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination in hiring); 
Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: 
Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621, 646–48 (1982) (describing the qualification 
requirement in discrimination law as “more than any other, . . . difficult to define”). 
301 See Player, supra note 300, at 646–48. 
302 See supra Section I.B.3. 
303 See supra text accompanying note 144. 
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selling practices of the firm to ensure that the firm in fact sells to all 
consumers who wish to buy for resale. As a remedy for failure to permit 
rights trading, a non-personalization order is similarly less expensive to 
enforce than an order compelling sale of rights to buy at low personalized 
prices, because a non-personalization order requires only review of prices, 
whereas a compelled sale order requires not only review of the prices 
charged by the firm for purchase rights, but two additional things. The court 
must ensure that the firm supplies all willing buyers with purchase rights and 
ensure that end consumers are in fact able to redeem their rights in exchange 
for the product.304 Thus the forced dealing remedy requires everything that 
non-personalization requires of courts, and more.  
Courts applying the antitrust laws have broad authority to impose any 
remedy that makes victims whole, not limited to reversing the conduct that 
serves as the basis for the underlying violation of the antitrust laws, and 
courts in fact have enforced orders compelling non-discriminatory pricing 
in lieu of forced sharing.305 Consider the Ninth Circuit’s review, in Image 
Tech. Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., of an order requiring both sales 
at judicially-mandated prices and non-discrimination in pricing.306 The 
conduct at issue in the case was a refusal by Kodak to sell parts to 
independent suppliers of copier repair services who competed with Kodak 
in the repair market.307 The Supreme Court ruled the conduct potentially 
anticompetitive and on remand the district court ordered Kodak to sell parts 
to all buyers at reasonable and non-discriminatory prices.308 Concerned that 
the reasonableness requirement “involves the court in a matter generally 
considered beyond our function, namely, direct price administration,” the 
Ninth Circuit struck the reasonableness requirement from the district court’s 
order, reflecting judicial reluctance to engage in price administration.309 But 
the court preserved the requirement of non-discrimination in pricing, 
observing that “Kodak should be permitted to charge all of its customers . . 
                                                                                                                     
304 Cf. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004) 
(lamenting the fact that “[n]ew systems must be designed and implemented simply to make . . . access 
possible”). 
305 See FTC v. Nat’l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429–30 (1957) (approving the enjoining of an 
otherwise lawful pricing practice to remedy an antitrust violation); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 166, at 1379 
(“The most common remedy in civil prosecutions is termination of the unlawful conduct. But . . . the 
typical equitable remedy also includes restrictions on the conduct of the defendants intended to both 
prevent the conduct from re-occurring and to restore competitive conditions that may have been altered 
by the conduct.”). 
306 See Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1224–26 (9th Cir. 1997). 
307 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 458 (1992). 
308 See id. at 480–86 (holding that Kodak’s conduct could violate the Sherman Act’s prohibition on 
monopolization); Post-Judgment Memorandum on Motion for Permanent Injunction, Image Tech. 
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C 87–1686 AWT, 1996 WL 101173, *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 
1996) (defending reasonable pricing order). 
309 Image Tech., 125 F.3d at 1226. 
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. any nondiscriminatory price that the market will bear.”310 The court showed 
no concern at all about the capacity of the district court to prohibit 
discrimination in pricing, and affirmed the non-discrimination order even 
though as a technical matter the conduct that violated the antitrust laws in 
the case was Kodak’s refusal to deal with independent servicers at 
reasonable prices, not Kodak’s charging of discriminatory prices to 
servicers.311  
Non-personalization of prices is only a viable remedy, however, if the 
government is the primary enforcer of an antitrust prohibition on arbitrage 
prevention.312 The non-personalization remedy reduces the incentives of all 
other possible enforcers—from low-price consumers who wish to engage in 
resale, to both low- and high-price consumers buying for personal 
consumption—to sue.313 The low-price consumer engaged in resale destroys 
its own resale market by winning suit for an order to put an end to the 
personalization of prices, because without the personalization of prices, and 
the consequent difference between the prices charged by the firm to the low-
price consumer and the prices charged by the firm to high-price consumers, 
resale opportunities disappear.314 The low-price consumer who buys for 
personal consumption but not for resale also may not have anything to gain 
from suing for an order to put an end to the personalization of prices, because 
non-personalized prices may price the low-price consumer out of the 
                                                                                                                     
310 Id. at 1225–26. 
311 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 458, 483, 486. Image Tech. is good authority for the use of an 
order prohibiting personalized pricing as a remedy for a refusal to deal, but not entirely on point as 
authority for the proposition that arbitrage prevention is anticompetitive. The purpose of the non-
discrimination order in Image Tech. was to ensure that competitors of Kodak in the market to repair 
copiers—that is, interbrand competitors—would gain equal access to Kodak-made spare parts, not to 
ensure that independent servicers would have the chance to arbitrage personalized pricing by Kodak of 
those spare parts (although there was evidence that Kodak had engaged in discriminatory pricing of the 
parts). See Image Tech., 125 F.3d at 1225 (indicating that the goal of the non-discrimination order is to 
“end Kodak’s service monopoly”); Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 457 (“Some customers found that the 
[competitors’] service was of higher quality.”). 
In a further reflection of the comfort of the courts with ordering non-discrimination in pricing, the 
court in United Shoe also ordered United Shoe to stop discriminating in the rates at which the company 
leased machinery. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 349 (D. Mass. 1953), 
aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (ordering “discriminatory . . . charges . . . removed”). Unlike 
Image Tech., United Shoe does not stand for the proposition that courts are willing to go beyond mere 
reversal of the conduct giving rise to antitrust liability in order to compel non-discrimination, however, 
because in United Shoe the theory of liability was that United Shoe had used discriminatory prices 
themselves to discourage competitors from entering the company’s markets. See supra Section I.C.1. 
Thus the non-discrimination order did no more than reverse the conduct that gave rise to antitrust liability.  
312 The government is already an important enforcer of the antitrust laws. See generally 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 642–50 (providing an overview of government enforcement of the antitrust 
laws). 
313 See generally id. at 652 (discussing private enforcement of the antitrust laws). 
314 Resale opportunities disappear only if the firm turns to uniform pricing in response to the order 
not to personalize prices. If the firm reverts to group-based pricing instead, then resale opportunities 
lessen, but do not disappear entirely. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
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market.315 By contrast, high-price consumers have some incentive to sue for 
non-personalization of prices, because non-personalized prices are lower for 
high-price consumers.316 But because a non-personalization order does not 
preclude the firm from refusing to sell to any consumer, a vindictive firm 
might be able credibly to threaten to punish high-price consumers for 
bringing suit by denying them access to the product forever, eliminating any 
gains they might enjoy from forcing the firm to charge non-personalized 
prices.317 Because private plaintiffs of all stripes lack the full incentive to 
challenge the personalization of prices, the government must be the primary 
challenger. 
II. PERSONALIZED PRICING AS A STANDALONE ANTITRUST VIOLATION 
Recognizing arbitrage prevention as monopolization, and ordering firms 
not to continue personalizing prices when they are caught preventing 
arbitrage, would seem at first glance to guarantee a world without 
personalized pricing.318 But in fact the power of an order not to personalize 
prices, or indeed of any remedy, including a forced dealing remedy, is 
limited, because these remedies can only be imposed in response to conduct 
that prevents arbitrage.319 Firms that do not raise prices to extract gains from 
resale, and which permit the resale of purchase rights, do not violate the 
prohibition on arbitrage prevention and therefore are not subject to remedial 
action by the courts.320 In theory, these firms should be unable to personalize 
prices.321 But in practice they might still be able to do so. 
The reason is not that resale would somehow remain prohibitively 
costly, despite the forbearance of firms from practices that restrict arbitrage. 
If resale were to remain too costly, then the product sold by the firm to low-
price buyers would simply not count as the same product as the product sold 
by the firm to high-price buyers.322 Recall that the financial viability of 
resale, after all costs are taken into account, determines whether two 
products, the resold product and the product for which the ultimate buyer 
substitutes the resold product, are the same, and therefore whether the 
                                                                                                                     
315 See supra text accompanying note 67. 
316 See supra text accompanying note 56. 
317 See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 4 
(1988) (arguing that people can act against interest to solve commitment problems). 
318 See supra Section I.C.4.ii.  
319 See LAYCOCK, supra note 128, at 1 (“A remedy is anything a court can do for a litigant who has 
been wronged or is about to be wronged.”). It is the inverse of Blackstone’s famous remark that “where 
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy,” namely, that where there is no legal right, there is also 
no legal remedy, which is the more scrupulously honored of the two. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES, 23; see John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE 
L.J. 87, 87 (1999).  
320 See LAYCOCK, supra note 128, at 1. 
321 See supra Sections I.A.3, I.A.4. 
322 See supra Section I.B.3. 
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personalization of prices for the two products counts as the personalization 
of prices for the same product.323 If resale remains prohibitively costly even 
after firms have eliminated all restraints on resale, it follows that the 
differentially-priced products in question are not actually the same product, 
and personalized pricing of the same product is therefore not actually taking 
place. 
The reason, instead, for which personalized pricing might persist despite 
the absence of restraints on, and concomitant financial viability of, arbitrage 
is that even when resale is unrestrained and financially viable, there is no 
guarantee that resellers will in fact fully exploit the opportunity to resell, and 
therefore no guarantee that personalized pricing will disappear.324 Antitrust 
has long recognized that a firm can have a monopoly even without engaging 
in anticompetitive conduct, simply because, through laziness, incompetence, 
or pure accident, no competitor mounts a challenge.325 It follows that, at least 
in some markets, personalized pricing will persist despite antitrust 
condemnation of arbitrage prevention, and consumers will therefore 
continue to be harmed. If antitrust wishes fully to protect consumers from 
personalized pricing, and antitrust’s consumer protection mission suggests 
that antitrust should wish to do that, then antitrust should go beyond treating 
arbitrage prevention as an antitrust violation to treat the act of personalizing 
prices itself as a violation of the antitrust laws.326 Without directly 
                                                                                                                     
323 See supra text accompanying note 216. 
324 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[P]ersons 
may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a monopoly, automatically so to say: that is, without 
having intended either to put an end to existing competition, or to prevent competition from arising when 
none had existed; they may become monopolists by force of accident.”). 
325 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 
1518–22 (1972). 
326 For antitrust’s consumer welfare mission, see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original 
and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93–
96 (1982) (“[The legislative d]ebates [surrounding passage of the Sherman Act] strongly suggest that 
Congress condemned trusts and monopolies because they had enough market power to raise prices and 
‘unfairly’ extract wealth from consumers, turning it into monopoly profits.”). 
Treating the act of personalizing prices itself as a violation of the antitrust laws would not only 
allow antitrust to reach personalized pricing made possible by the laziness or incompetence of resellers, 
but also allow antitrust to reach a second area of personalized pricing that would not be reached by 
condemning only the prevention of arbitrage. That area is personalized pricing of units of a good sold to 
the same consumer. Recall that personalized pricing is the charging of maximum willingness to pay on 
a unit basis. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. Even if a firm sells a particular product only to a 
single consumer, the firm can personalize prices by charging the consumer the maximum the consumer 
is willing to pay for each unit. See Varian, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that “[f]irst-degree, or perfect price 
discrimination involves the seller charging a different price for each unit of the good in such a way that 
the price charged for each unit is equal to the maximum willingness to pay for that unit.”). Coca-Cola 
might charge, for example, $3.00 for the first unit of Coke the consumer buys, $2.50 for the second, 
$1.00 for the third, and so on. Personalized pricing is just as harmful when aimed at a single consumer 
purchasing multiple units as when it is aimed at multiple purchasers. Cf. supra Section I.A.1. As a result 
of personalized pricing, the Coke buyer may go from purchasing two Cokes at $2.50 each, and therefore 
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condemning the act of personalizing prices, antitrust cannot hope fully to 
stamp out that act. 
The courts should treat the act of personalizing prices as a free-standing 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, tied perhaps to the general 
language of Section 2, which prohibits “monopoliz[ation]” without defining 
the term.327 The courts cannot take the alternative approach of tying the 
prohibition to the monopolization rules discussed in this article—the 
requirements of anticompetitive conduct and monopoly power that have 
been developed by the courts as interpretations of the language of Section 
2—because of the difficulty associated with treating the act of personalizing 
prices itself as anticompetitive conduct.328 Unlike the act of limiting 
arbitrage, the act of personalizing prices does not itself stifle intrabrand 
competition, and so the requirement of harm to competition, an essential 
element of a traditional monopolization claim, is missing.329 
Relying upon antitrust’s consumer protection goal to create a free-
standing prohibition on personalized pricing out of whole cloth would not 
be altogether unprecedented, because antitrust has relied on the consumer 
welfare standard radically to alter antitrust rules in the past.330 Indeed, the 
Chicago School of antitrust analysis brought the consumer welfare standard 
into antitrust precisely for that purpose.331 The Chicago School believed that 
prevailing antitrust rules punished firms that dominated markets for the 
legitimate purpose of controlling the resources necessary to produce the best 
                                                                                                                     
enjoying a consumer surplus of 52 cents, to purchasing three Cokes at the aforementioned prices and 
enjoying only 3 cents of consumers surplus (assuming that the firm personalizes prices for each unit to 
be one penny below the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for that unit). If a firm sells a particular 
product to multiple consumers, then condemnation of arbitrage prevention forces the firm to stop 
personalizing the prices of multiple units sold to the same consumer, because arbitrage prevention is 
necessary to stop different consumers from reselling to each other some of the multiple price-
personalized units sold to them by the firm. The consumer charged $1.00 for a third can of Coke could, 
for example, profitably resell that can to the consumer that Coca-Cola wishes to charge $3.00 for a first 
can of Coke. The capacious definition of product sameness advocated in Section I.B.3 ensures that very 
few products, even individually-customized products, will be sold only to a single individual consumer 
for antitrust purposes. But there may still be some unique products that a firm sells only to a single 
consumer. For those products, condemnation of personalized pricing itself would restore some surplus 
to the individual consumers who buy them. For a related discussion, see supra note 44. 
327 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
328 See supra text accompanying note 45. For a discussion of the evolution of the monopolization 
requirement as a set of interpretations of Section 2, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 291–92. 
329 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
330 See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Antitrust Duty to Charge Low Prices, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1741, 
1755–63 (2018). 
331 See George L. Priest, Bork’s Strategy and the Influence of the Chicago School on Modern 
Antitrust Law, 57 J.L. & ECON. S1, S10–11 (2014). 
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quality products at the lowest cost.332 The courts ultimately used the 
consumer welfare standard as the sole justification for altering the antitrust 
laws to tolerate salutary dominance, despite the lack of any other basis in 
statute or caselaw for doing so.333 The courts reversed longstanding 
prohibitions on exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, for example, 
replacing those prohibitions with case-by-case review for harm to 
consumers.334 And the courts stopped condemning mergers in concentrated 
industries out of hand.335 The courts made those and other changes without 
express authorization from Congress, or the aid of precedent, but simply 
because they concluded that antitrust’s mission is to protect consumers—the 
consumer welfare standard—and they believed that these changes to the law 
would be good for consumers.336 There is no reason for which the consumer 
welfare standard should only be used to restrict the ambit of antitrust rules, 
sparing some conduct for the sake of expanding consumer welfare, but 
should never be used to expand the ambit of antitrust rules, by extending 
them to condemn new categories of conduct, such as personalized pricing.337  
CONCLUSION 
The information age promises to make personalized pricing a reality, at 
                                                                                                                     
332 In the decades preceding the triumph of the Chicago School in the 1970s, the courts had tended 
to pursue the promotion of competition regardless of the effect of competition on consumers. See N. Pac. 
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive 
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It 
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation 
of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while 
at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and 
social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by 
the Act is competition.”); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“Congress 
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented 
industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must 
give effect to that decision.”). For an example of the Chicago School rejoinder, see Robert H. Bork, 
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 12 (1966) (“Congress was very 
concerned that the law should not interfere with business efficiency. This concern, which was repeatedly 
stressed, was so strong that it led Congress to agree that monopoly itself was lawful if it was gained and 
maintained only by superior efficiency. Thus the desire to protect small firms from annihilation by 
monopoly-minded rivals did not extend an inch beyond the bounds of the consumer-welfare rationale.”). 
333 For an overview of these changes, see Richard Schmalensee, Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy 
in U.S. Antitrust, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 11, 22 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
334 See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Indispensability of Per Se Rules in Budget-Constrained Antitrust 
Adjudication 31–33 (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2896453. 
335 See id. at 29–31. 
336 For the full list of rule changes, see id. at 27–36. For the unprecedented nature of the changes, 
see Woodcock, supra note 330, at 1755–63. The changes were so sudden, and ungrounded in existing 
law, that the Supreme Court never ratified the changes in the merger context, and indeed still has not 
done so through to the present day. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 22, at 452–55. 
337 See Woodcock, supra note 330, at 1762–63. 
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least approximately. As the only regulatory regime having the general 
mission of protecting consumer welfare in the economic sense, antitrust can 
block the emergence of this consumer-surplus-reducing practice. One 
approach would be for antitrust to recognize that anticompetitive conduct 
lies at the heart of much personalized pricing.338 For no firm can personalize 
prices unless the firm can stop low-price buyers from reselling the product 
to high-price buyers. To personalize prices, then, firms generally must 
impose restraints on arbitrage, and those restraints are anticompetitive. They 
undermine resale competition in the market to buy the firm’s own product.  
The refusal of a firm to sell units of its product for resale is not protected 
by the general right of firms to choose their clients. In recent decades, the 
courts have recognized that the right to refuse to deal does not protect the 
termination of a prior profitable course of dealing with a competitor. The 
refusal of a price-personalizing firm to deal with a low-price buyer seeking 
to buy additional units for resale is precisely the sort of termination of a prior 
profitable course of dealing that the courts remain willing to condemn. 
Even when the courts are willing to condemn a refusal to deal, such as 
the refusal to sell to resellers that underpins personalized pricing, the courts 
hesitate to provide a remedy because they worry about the administrability 
of judicially-compelled dealings between competitors. But condemning 
restraints on arbitrage does not implicate this concern, because courts have 
available an alternative remedy to forced dealing that is more effective at 
alleviating the harm of restrictions on arbitrage. That alternative remedy is 
directly to order firms not to personalize prices. Such an order would 
preserve for a firm the discretion to decide whether or not to sell to any 
particular buyer, as well as the discretion of the firm to decide the absolute 
prices to charge for its product, so long as the prices are not personalized on 
a unit basis. Thus the courts could avoid compelling firms to deal with any 
particular buyer, and avoid the problem of setting absolute price levels, 
while still forcing offenders to desist from personalizing prices.  
Antitrust condemnation of restraints on arbitrage are unlikely, however, 
to preclude all personalized pricing, because some firms may be able to 
escape competition from resellers out of luck, rather than by taking steps to 
prevent arbitrage. Antitrust can fully eliminate personalized pricing only by 
recognizing the act of personalizing prices itself as an independent violation 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The courts have broad authority to take 
that step under antitrust’s consumer welfare standard, because personalized 
pricing always harms consumers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
338 For other approaches, see Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1400–16.  
